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The Origins
"Pirate .... Middle English from Latin pirata, from Greek peirates, 'attacker,' from
peiran, to attempt, attack, from peira, an attempt .... From Indo-European root per-."5
"per..5 .... To try, risk;" from which come the modem English words: fear, peril,
experience, expert, empire, and pirate.
American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language (William Morris, ed.) (1969), pp. 998, 1534.

T

he word "piracy" is used in modern English in many different ways,
from a half-admiring description of the shrewd practices of an
assertive businessman cutting the corners of morality but strictly within the
law, to a highly technical legal word of art related to some crimes for which
people have been hanged. In between lie uses that relate to unrecognized
rebels, naval vessels acting beyond their authority, naval vessels acting within
their national commissions to interfere with peaceful commerce in ways the
international legal order will not tolerate, and many other shades of meaning.
The most cursory examination of learned literature, treaty articles and
national statutes shows at least six different meanings: (1) A vernacular usage
with no direct legal implications; (2) An international law meaning related to
unrecognized states or recognized states whose governments are not
considered to be empowered at international law to authorize the sorts of
public activity that is questioned, like the Barbary States of about 1600-1830,
the Malay Sultanates of about 1800-1880, and the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms of
about 1820-1830; (3) An international law meaning related to unrecognized
belligerency, like Confederate States commerce raiders and privateers during
the American Civil War of1861-65 in the eyes of the Federal Government of
the United States; (4) An internationallaw meaning related to the private acts
of foreigners against other foreigners in circumstances making criminal
jurisdiction by a third state acceptable to the international community despite
the absence of the usual territorial or nationality links that are normally
required to justify the extension abroad of national criminal jurisdiction; (5)
Various special international law meanings derived from particular treaty
negotiations; and (6) Various municipal (i.e., national, domestic) law
meanings defined by the statutes and practices of individual states. It is
possible to elaborate this list to take account of ambiguous or inconsistent
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state practice and diplomatic correspondence, special technical interpretations within the learned international legal writings and different states'
positions as to particular incidents, and other traditional modes of legal
analysis.
All of these uses of the word "piracy" have been argued from time to time
to rest on classical writings and precedents. In the days leading up to the
Westphalian settlement of Europe in 1648, citations to Greek and Latin
sources were a major element oflegal argumentation. Those renaissance legal
arguments and the municipal law of the European sea powers, particularly
England, purported to rest on Roman law and usage. Thus, to understand
fully the modern meanings of the term "piracy" it is necessary first to
examine the Greek and Latin writings and Roman usages.
Time changes the meaning of words, and it is an error in scholarship to
attribute to ancient or even not very ancient authors the full range of
implication that a word carries in current usage. An amusing example appears
in the 14th century Middle English poem Sir Gawain and the Green Knight where
the Green Knight, entering King Arthur's great dining hall, asks, "Where is
... the governour of this gyng?" and it can be shown by analyzing the uses of
the word "governour" and "gyng" ("gang") in other medieval works that
the modern cockney connotation ofjocular contempt that might be implied
from the context of the Green Knight's speech is simply not there. 1
When, in 1811, Sir T.S. Raffles, the British Lieutenant Governor ofJava,
wrote to Lord Minto, the Governor-General ofIndia, that "It is unfortunately
the practice in some of the Malay States rather to encourage the young nobles
of high rank, especially those of the Rajah's own extraction, whose
maintenance would fall otherwise upon the Rajah himself, to subsist
themselves by piratical practices"2 he was using the word in a non-legal sense
insofar as the attitudes of the Malays was being explained. At the same time,
from its European legal implications he concluded that suppressive activities
by the British Navy might be justifiable as a matter of international law. He
seems to have been conscious of the two meanings of the word when he
advised that the British in the first instance, rather than bearing the burden
themselves of sweeping the "pirates" from the seas, should "oblige every
Rajah to refuse to every description of pirates ... any sort of assistance or
protection in his own territories."3 This suggestion, with much legal
difficulty, became translated into British policy and assertions of internationallaw over a period of sixty or seventy years.
In the light of this and similar persistent confusions, before embarking on
an analysis of the precise meaning of the word "piracy" as used in ancient
texts it might be useful to set forth a few of the many instances in which the
word or its derivatives has been used by translators to reflect their own ideas
as to when it is appropriate to use it despite the fact that the word does not
appear in any form in the text being translated. Since so much nineteenth and
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twentieth century writing about "piracy" cites ancient usages that in fact
exist only in the nineteenth and twentieth century purported translations, but
not in the ancient texts, it might be possible to clear away some common
misconceptions of our own time, when some citations to earlier scholars,
which in turn rest on still earlier scholarly citations, which in turn appear to
rest on non-legal translations of words that have no connection with the
ancient conception of "piracy, " seem to have become conventional wisdom;
i.e., seem to be accepted as correctly reflecting the ancient concepts merely
because so often repeated in scholarly writing.
Coleman Phillipson, whose analysis of classical conceptions of internationallaw is justly famous to the degree that it seems to have almost cut off
later scholarship, wrote: "In the Homeric age the practice [of "piracy"] was
looked upon as a creditable ... means of enrichment."4 Without disputing
Phillipson's point, which will be examined more closely below, it is
interesting to check his citations. These include Homer's Iliad,s and Odyssey,6
and Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War.7 In fact, in none of these
places cited by Phillipson does the word "peirato" or any of its derivatives
appear in the original Greek.8 Instead, the original Greek uses derivatives of
the word "diapertho"9 or the word "Ieia. "10 Indeed, even if the word "peirato"
did appear in the places cited in Homer, it would not indicate a clear usage of
the word, since, aside from some clearly inappropriate contexts, what most
commonly appears is a formula of words that seems to have been a customary
greeting addressed to strangers:
Is it on some business, or do ye wander at random over the sea, even as 'pirates,' who
wander hazarding their lives and bring evil to men of other lands?11

This particular formula, which does not include the word "peirato" or any of
its derivatives in the original Greek, is repeated in many places, including
Hesiod12 and Thucydides. 13 And yet it is the very Thucydides passage not
using the word "peirato" or any of its derivatives that is mentioned by at least
one very eminent twentieth century scholar as evidence that "piracy" in the
modern sense was accepted as legitimate in ancient Greece.1 4 Obviously, it
was not "piracy" that was legitimate, but something else, labeled with a
different word, that mayor may not have been analogous to the modern legal
conception of "piracy."
It may be significant that the more or less standard glossary, Autenrieth's
Homeric Dictionary, defines "peiran . .. -ato" as "test, attack, make trial of, put
to proof, contend with" etc., but does not record any usage in Homer that
would correspond with a sense of illegality or even roving to seize the
property of others regardless of legality .15
Similarly, in Herodotus's history of the Persian War, the passage most
frequently cited as mentioning "piracy" does not use the Greek word or any
ofits derivatives, and that passage is translated properly as saying merely the
coming of "Bronze men of the sea" was predicted by an oracle.16

4

The Law of Piracy

Perhaps the most egregious anomaly of translation is in the frequent
citation to an historical episode in which the citizens of the "polis" of
Halonnesos refused to receive their property back from Philip ofMacedon as
a gift, but insisted that they had never lost title since the capture had been by
"pirates," who lack the legal power to alter rights to title in property. But the
Greek original does not contain the word "peirato" or any of its derivatives.t7
As for Roman sources,IS again some of the most often cited writings
purportedly defining the classical conception of "piracy" do not use the word
in either its Greek or Latin ("pirata") form. For example, Cicero, in his second
speech Against Verres, does not mention "pirata" in the passage cited time and
again by renaissance and later scholars as one of the sources of the law of
"piracy." The word he uses is "praedones. "19 And Livy's translator gives a
totally distorted impression of the legal relations between the Great
Pompey's son, Sextus Pompey, and Octavian Caesar, building on the
distorted picture painted by the not wholly impartial Livy himself, in this
passage:
When Sextus Pompey again made the sea dangerous through acts of piracy [latrociniis],
and did not maintain the peace to which he had agreed, Caesar undertook the inevitable
war against him and fought two drawn naval battles.20

In the original Latin the word "pirata" or its derivatives does not appear. 21
There are other anomalies in this passage that point out the need for great
circumspection in drawing far-reaching legal conclusions from the use of
Latin words in ancient sources. The word "bello" (war; belligerency) is used
to describe the conflict between two claimants to some public authority in
Rome in the turmoil following Julius Caesar's assassination and before
Octavian achieved full mastery of the political system and became Caesar
Augustus. But if the Roman law of war applied, as the word would seem to
indicate, then the fundamental Roman conception of "war" as a legal status
with legal implications would have applied in the absence of declaration. And
it would have applied against those who commit "latrociniis" acts. This path of
analysis leads to complications of significant magnitude and in the light of
other writings seems wholly misguided. It is very likely that Livy was using
the word "latrociniis" perjoratively and not legally, and the word "bello" to
mean "struggle" or some similar non-legal idea, rather than war. Since these
distinctions are vital to a careful legal analysis, it may be concluded that not
only translations, but even original texts must be read very carefully before
legal implications are drawn from them.

The Greek and Roman Conception of "Piracy"
Thucydides's description of political life in the Aegean area rests not only
on the poetic formula of greeting, but on other passages in Homer22 and, no
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doubt, oral and perhaps lost written traditions familiar enough to his
generation that citation was not felt to be necessary by him. Modern
scholarship sees this proud description as evidence not only of a political
system accepting the organized use of force by small bands without pejorative
implications or any deep analysis of the political structure of the bands '
themselves,23 but also of a far-reaching economic order. During the 10th and
9th centuries B.C.,24 such wars and raids reflected the struggle for survival
and economic gain by combinations of families and small communities as part
of a larger economic system in which "Forcible seizure followed by
distribution in this fashion, was one way to acquire metal or other goods from
an outside source."25 The seizures did not necessarily involve essential
supplies, and the concepts of justifiable behavior apparently extended to
permit these raids by Greeks against Greeks and non-Greeks alike merely for
gain. Given the state of politics and economics in the area, such raids were
probably not the principal means of commerce, and it has been suggested that
gift-exchanges were the main mechanism for economic transfers. 26 The
system might bear some similarity for purposes of this study with the Viking
political and economic system of Scandinavia in the 9th to 11th centuries
A.D.27
The earliest time when the surviving literature in Greek uses the word
peirato and its derivatives to describe anybody appears to be about 140 B.C.,
and it is to some specific political and economic communities of the Eastern
Mediterranean littoral that the word was applied. Polybius, whose Histories is
the principal source of much of our knowledge of the rise of the Roman
Republic, uses the word peiraton in a passage translated by W.R. Paton in a
way avoiding the confusions wrought by too frequent use of the English word
"pirate," but creating an equivalent confusion. He refers to: "Euripidas with
two companies of Eleans together with his freebooters [peiraton] and
mercenaries ... "28 Just what "freebooter" means in that context seems very
unclear. But what does seem clear is that the word "peirato" and its derivatives
was being applied not to brigands or others outside the legal order, but to
small communities including fighting men who were regarded as capable of
forming alliances and participating in wars as they were fought between
acknowledged political leaders within the legal order of the time.
Diodorus Siculus, writing about 60 B.C., uses the word in connection with
events of 304 B.C.:
[Amyntas] ... suddenly confronted some pirates [peiratais] who had been sent out by
Demetrias . . . the Rhodians took the ships with . . . Timocles, the chief pirate
[arclJipeirates ].29

The usage of Livy, writing in Latin 29 B.C.-14 -A.D., is similar. In
describing events of190 B.C., he refers to Nicander, whom he calls a pirate
chief (archipirata) , fighting with five ships as an ally ofRome. 30 In referring to
the "war" of 68-67 B.C. by which Pompey the Great cleared the Eastern
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Mediterranean of Cilician commerce-raiding communities,31 Livy not only
refers to the struggle as "war" and describes it as ifit were legally indeed a
"war" at Roman law, but he refers to its ending by a negotiated surrender
under which the "pirates" agreed to conform to more settled ways:
Gnaeus Pompeius was ordered by a law passed by the popular assembly to pursue the
pirates, who had cut off the traffic in grain. Within forty days he had cleared them from
all the seas. He brought the war [belloque] against them to an end in Cilicia, received the
surrender of the pirates and gave them land and cities. 32

Finally, the Greek Plutarch, writing in about 100 A.D., paints such a clear
picture of the "pirates" to which Livy referred in his brief synopsis of the
"war" of Pompey to end their control of commerce in the Eastern
Mediterranean, that it seems worth setting out in some detail. Throughout
this translation, wherever the word "pirate" is used, the word "peirato" or
one of its derivatives is used in the original Greek,
The power of the pirates [peiratiki] had its seat in Cilicia [in Asia Minor, where they
flourished during the wars of Rome against Mithridates [88-85, 83-81,74 B.C.] ... until
they no longer attacked navigators only, but also laid waste islands and maritime cities.
And presently men whose wealth gave them power, and whose lineage was illustrious,
and those who laid claim to superior intelligence, began to embark on piratical [peiratike]
craft and share their enterprises, feeling that the occupation brought them a certain
reputation and distinction ... Their flutes and stringed instruments and drinking bouts
along every coast, their seizures of persons in high command, and their ransoming of
captured cities, were a disgrace to the Roman supremacy [hegemonias].33

To complete the picture of political societies conforming to the archaic
Eastern Mediterranean pattern, Plutarch mentions the unique religious
worship of the "pirates," whose rites centered on the town of Olympus in
southern Asia Minor.34 This combination of settled communities, religious
rites, musical tradition, and the conception of the "pirates" that what they
did was entirely proper, is what brought them into conflict with Rome. It is
hard to see how they were considered outlaws or violators of any law other
than the Roman conception of hegemony; a conception obviously not shared
by non-Romans at that time,35 and possibly not by many Romans of the
pre-Augustan age that Plutarch was writing about almost a century after the
reign of Augustus. On the other hand, Plutarch seems to have accepted the
idea that such political societies, no matter how conforming to a traditional
pattern, were an anachronism beyond the orderly system within which Rome
had become accustomed to operate. The word "peirato" and its derivatives
seems to be applied to traditional Eastern Mediterranean societies operating
in ways that had been accepted as legitimate for at least a millenium. But the
conception of Roman order, the idea that Roman hegemony was a matter of
right, of law, had begun to make the continued existence of "pirate"
communities unacceptable even if no justification for distinguishing those
"pirate" communities from their less assertive neighbors could be found
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directly in Roman or general international law as it was applied between
Rome and other political communities of the Eastern Mediterranean.
The procedures for the "war against the Pirates" adopted by the Roman
Senate were extraordinary and reflect these legal doubts as to the precise
status of the Roman hegemony and its legal basis. A law was passed by the
Republic's Senate in 68 B.C. under which Pompey the Great was
commissioned to subdue them not as a naval commander (the word" admiral"
had not yet been invented, but the Loeb Classical Library's translator of
Plutarch uses it here) but as a king deriving his sovereign powers from the
Roman donation, thus opposing the "pirates' " sovereignty with Roman
sovereignty and making of the piratical society something like rebels.
Plutarch makes it clear that this procedure was shocking: Pompey was
commissioned by the Roman Senate to take the seas away from the "pirates
[peiraton] " by giving him "not an admiralty, but an out-and-out monarchy and
irresponsible [sic: "unbridled" might be a better translation] power over all
men. "36 His authority was decreed to extend to land areas within 400 furlongs
of the sea, thus to include the entire territory of the Aeg~anJslaD.ds, CreteAIld
the Dodecanese and enough of the land of Asia Minor to include all their
villages and Olympus, the "pirates' " religious center.
Plutarch's description of the course of the war, and the negotiation for
peace, seems to confirm this impression, that Rome treated the "pirates" not
as outlaws but as enemies to be met in war and defeated. After dispersing the
"pirates' " fleet,
Some of the pirate bands [peiratorion] that were still roving at large begged for mercy, and
since he [Pompey] treated them humanely, and after seizing their ships and persons did
them no further harm, the rest became hopeful of mercy too, and ... betook themselves
to Pompey with their wives and children, and surrendered to him. All these he spared,
and it was chiefly by their aid that he tracked down, seized, and punished those who
were still lurking in concealment because conscious of unpardonable crimes.37
But the most numerous and powerful had bestowed their families and treasures and
useless folk in forts and strong citadels near the Taurus mountains, while they
themselves manned their ships and awaited Pompey's attack near the promontory of
Coracesium in Cilicia; here they were defeated in a battle and then besieged. At last,
however, they ... surrendered themselves, together with their cities [poleis] and islands
of which they were in control ... The men themselves, who were more than 20,000 in
number, he [Pompey] did not once think of putting to death ... [but] determined to
transfer the men from the sea to land ... to till the ground. Some of them, therefore,
were received and incorporated into the small and half-deserted cities of Cilicia ... To
most of them, however, he gave as a residence Dyme in Achaea, which was then bereft
of men and had much good land.38

Pompey's monarchical position under the commission issued by the Roman
Senate received something of a comeuppance shortly after, when Metellus,
another Roman general, was with rather less mercy wiping out Cilician
"pirate" villages in Crete. Since all of Crete lay within 400 furlongs of the sea
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Pompey apparently regarded this as an encroachment on his authority and
sent one of his lieutenants, Lucius Octavius, to join with the "pirates"
fighting against Metellus. Metellus won, "captured the pirates [peiratas] and
punished them, and then sent Octavius away ... "39 There is no further
reference to Pompey's commission in this context.
It seems clear that the word "pirate" was used by Plutarch to classify
communities with which Pompey felt it was appropriate not only to go to war
and conclude a peace treaty, but even to send military assistance to, as to an
ally, when they accepted the Senate's ordinance subjecting them to the law of
Roman "hegemony."
On the other hand, it appears that there was a change in Roman concepts
underway. To label a group "pirates" was not merely to classify their way of
life within a legal order as we still use the word "Viking" to evoke a way of
life legitimate within the harsh legal order of the middle ages. By the time
Plutarch wrote, there was an implication of impropriety to that way of life. It
had nothing to do with political motivation or criminality even under the law
of Rome as applied in the Empire or allied areas. It dealt instead with the place
of an antiquated way of life in a new commercial and political order that
could not countenance interference with trade in the Mediterranean Sea. It
was not bound to "piratical" acts on the "high seas," but to a conception of
"piratical" villages forming a society [poleis] on land which refused to accept
Roman supremacy. Relations with the "pirates" were relations of war, not of
policing the internal or imperial Roman law; the results of Roman victory
were the normal results of a victorious war at that time and in that place.40
"War" to the Romanjurists was not merely a condition of fact with people
of one village or religious worship killing or enslaving people of another
village or divine descent. War was regarded as a legal status even if no active
fighting was occurring, and since victory or defeat in war had such enormous
consequences for the belligerents and their families, reflecting the vitality of
the vivifying force given by the tribe's or community's "God" or totemic life
source to some eponymous ancestor or founder, the ceremonies involved in
the creation of that status were essentially religious. The religious element of
the status of war was not a mere prayer for victory, but reflected much deeper
concerns for the continuance of the race. Virgil's epic poem, Aeneid, telling
the mythology surrounding the founding of the Roman tradition in Italy by
Aeneas, a son of the defeated King Priam fleeing from the sack of Troy, is
unmistakably, in this sense, a religious work.
The interplay between religion and the secular law between "nations" or
"races" or god-protected communities and tribes, is evident from the
narration of the great literary (but not always accurate) historian Livy, who
grew to manhood during the days ofJulius Caesar, and wrote his history of
Rome with access to sacred documents during the early days of the reign of
Augustus. He details from the oldest treaty in the holy archives (c. 670 B.C.)
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the treaty-making procedures of Roman tradition, setting out some of the
formulas of words and symbolic acts, involving a freshly plucked holy plant,
the sacrifice of a pig, and metrical ritual (which in part, alas, he fails to record
as "not worth the trouble of quoting"). Through these rituals the titulary
gods on both sides (in this case the Romans and the Albans) were called upon
separately to witness the commitment of the current holders of the life of each
god's own community to the sanctity of the pledge. 41 In this particular
incident, as reported by Livy, the "war" between the Romans and Albans was
put into the hands of three representatives from each side, chosen for their
martial vigor and thus presumably reflecting the vigor of the holy life of each
community as well as its mere secular martial prowess. The Romans won in a
close contest, only one champion for each side surviving, and Horatius for
Rome ultimately killing his Alban antagonist as the two armies stood by and
watched. The two sides then buried their dead and Alba accepted Roman rule
submitting their entire treasure and lives to the mercy of the Roman god
represented by the Roman political organization.42
Livy also details the ceremony followed by the Romans even into his own
time when "war" was to be begun. In Livy's version, the ceremony for a
formal declaration of war was adopted from the religious rites of the ancient
Roman tribe of the Aequicolae and taken over by priests (fetials) representing
the entire Roman community. It is worth repeating in its entirety for an
understanding of the importance of the ceremony and the significance of
Cicero's argument in Livy's own time43 that "war" against "pirates" could be
begun without it:
\"hen the envoy arrives at the frontier of the state from which satisfaction is sought, he
covers his head with a woolen cap and says: Hear me, Jupiter! 'Hear me, land of
So-and-so! Hear me, 0 righteousness! I am the accredited spokesman of the Roman
people. I come as their envoy in the name ofjustice and religion, and ask credence for my
words.' The particular demands follow and the envoy, calling Jupiter to witness,
proceeds: 'If my demand for the restitution of those men or those goods be contrary to
religion and justice, then never let me be a citizen of my country.' [Presumably so that
the results ofimpiety will not be visited on the entire community.] The formula, with
only minor changes, is repeated when the envoy crosses the frontier, to the first man he
subsequently meets, when he passes through the gate of the town, and when he enters the
public square. Ifhis demand is refused, after thirty-three days ... war is declared in the
following form: 'Hear, Jupiter; hear Janus Quirinus; hear, all ye gods in heaven, on
earth, and under the earth: I call you to witness that the people of So-and-so are unjust
and refuse reparation ... ' The envoy then returns to Rome for consultation. The
formula in which the king asked the opinion of the elders was approximately this: Of the
goods, or suits, or causes, concerning which the representative of the Roman people has
made demands of the representative of ... [So-and-so], which goods or suits or causes
they have failed to restore or settle, or satisfy ... : speak, what think you?' The person
thus first addressed replied: 'I hold that those things be sought by means of just and
righteous war. Thus I give my vote and my consent.' The same question was put to the
others in rotation, and if a majority voted in favour, war was agreed upon. The fetial
thereupon proceeded to the enemy frontier carrying a spear with a head either ofiron or
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hardened wood, and in the presence of not less than three men of military age made the
following proclamation: 'Whereas the peoples of [So-and-so ] ... have committed acts
and offences against the Roman people, and whereas the Roman people have
commanded that there be war with [them], and the Senate of the Roman people has
ordained, consented, and voted that there be war with [them]: I therefore, and the
Roman people hereby declare and make war on [them].' The formal declaration made,
the spear was thrown across the frontier. 44

These forms, or at least their underlying concepts, were employed against not
only the South Italian peoples with whom the Romans shared a similar
culture, but also against the North Italian Gauls 45 and presumably everybody
else with whom it was religiously conceived that a struggle on earth reflected
competing demands on a divine source of life symbolized by tribal or
community gods. 46
The most commonly cited authority for the original Roman legal
conception of "piracy" adopted as the source for modem European views of
international law on the subject is Marcus Tullius Cicero. Cicero, an active
lawyer and politic an contemporary with Julius Caesar, killed apparently by
order ofMarc Antony in 43 B.C. in the aftermath of the murder ofJulius,47 has
been cited inappropriately often,48 but did in fact mention "pirates [pirata]" in
one passage that evidences the changing legal conceptions of the generation
that gave Pompey the legal power to subdue them by simply asserting a
superior legal power over the territory and seas in which their outmoded
culture survived. In that passage he merely denies any legal obligation to keep
an oath to "pirates" on the ground that by being the enemies [hostes] of all
communities, they are not subject to the law of the universal society that
makes oaths binding between different communities. 49 There are many
reasons for regarding this statement as not indicating any considered legal
opinion. Hugo Grotius himself, the great Dutch scholar and jurist of
intemationallaw of the first half of the 17th century, criticized this passage on
the ground that the observance of an oath is owed to God, not to the person
receiving the benefit of the oath.so Other factors not usually considered by
those citing this passage of Cicero as evidence that "pirates" in his day were
common criminalss1 include the fact that the passage appears in a work on
moral duties, not law; as Cicero himself noted, the two do not always
coincide.52 Moreover, bearing in mind Cicero's political situation in 44 B.C.
when this was written, and the episode in Julius Caesar's life involving the
same Cilician "pirates, "53 and the peculiar legal authority given to Cicero's
sometimes friend Pompey coupled with Pompey's use of that authority
against Metellus and the fact that Pompey was by now dead and his twentyfive year old treaty with the "pirates" could be discarded without personally
insulting him, and some notion of the complexity of Cicero's thinking can be
appreciated. Indeed, the "pirates" that had been suppressed by Pompey in 67
B.C. had revived by the time Cicero was writing this, and Marc Antony was
believed to have mobilized them against Brutus and Cassius. Cicero's
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condemnation of the "pirates" seems thus less a statement of a legal opinion
than a slap at his enemy, Antony.54
Perhaps the best evidence of the Roman jurists' actual conception of
"piracy" lies in the collection of undated opinions appearing in Justinian's
Digest of 534 A.D. 55 There appears to be in fact only one passage in the Digest
in which the word "pirata" or its derivatives appears. In the section on the law
of property dealing with the devolution of property rights in case of a
wrongful taking, the opinion of Paulus (c. 230 A.D.) is given: "P.J:IS.ons_who
have been captured by pirates or robbers remain [legally] free. "56
Two other opinions have been so often cited by so many scholars as
applying to "pirates" that it seems important to set them out here, even
though by failing to use the word "pirata" or any of its derivatives they seem
to demonstrate the opposite of the lesson for which they so often are cited.
Ulpian (d. 223 A.D.) wrote:
Enemies are th<;>se against whom the Roman people have publicly declared war, or who
themselves have declared war against the Roma~ people; others are called robbers or
brigands. Therefore, anyone who is captured by robbers, does not become their slave,
nor has any need of the right of postliminium. He, however, who has been taken by the
enemy, for instance, by the Germans or Parthians, becomes their slave, and recovers his
former condition by right of postliminium. 57

And Pomponius (c. 130 A.D.):
Those are enemies who declare war against us, or against whom we publicly declare
war; others are robbers or brigands. 58

The concept of property rights_needing reassessment after a legal capture,
and that in some circumstances captives would become free and property
would revert to its former owner on the conclusion of a war or on recapture,
was an important one. 59 It becomes much more important for purposes of this
study later when the European-based international law of naval prize makes
it significant that the captor be classified as a person able to change legal title
or not. It was by reading the word "capti" in the passage ascribed to Paulus, to
apply to goods and not merely to persons, and by classifying "pirates" as
covered by Ulpian and Pomponius as if they were brigands [latrones] or
robbers [praedones], that this legal conclusion was reached. But that analysis
belongs to a later chapter. 6o
One other implication of these passages seems significant. By attaching the
word" hostes [enemiesJ" to those against whom legal war [bellum] was waged,
and refusing to attach the word to police action against brigands and robbers
[latrones et praedones], an entirely different light is shed on the phrase" common
enemies of all mankind [hostes humanigenerisJ"61 as a paraphrase of its original,
Ciceronian, meaning. If this analysis is correct, and Cicero was speaking as
the technical lawyer later scholars have assumed in drawing their implications
from this reference to "pirates," then what he really seems to have meant was
that "pirates," are not robbers or brigands but legal enemies with the sole
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exception regarding promises to them that Grotius rightly criticises as
illogical and which is incorrect as history.
It may be concluded that the fundamental Greek and Roman conception of
"piracy" distinguished between robbers, who were criminals at Roman law,
and communities called "piratical" which were political societies of the
Eastern Mediterranean, pursuing an economic and political course which
accepted the legitimacy of seizing the goods and persons of strangers without
the religious and formal ceremonies the Romans felt were legally and
religiously necessary to begin a war. Nonetheless, the Romans treated them as
capable of going to "war"-indeed as in a permanent state of "war" with all
people except those with whom they had concluded an alliance. There is some
evidence that the Romans refused to extend the technical law of postliminium
to them, perhaps on the ground that since they never ceased to be at war,
there was no opportunity to determine the title to captured goods and no need
to recognize title in those deriving rights from belligerent capture; the goods
remained subject to recapture by anybody, and the rights of postliminium
would be applicable against the recaptor, just as in war goods recaptured
before the end of hostilities reverted to their original owner subject only to
payment of costs attributable directly to the recapturing action.62 The legal
rationalization found by the Roman Senate for suppressing the communities
of "pirates" was not an asserted Roman right to police the seas (although
Plutarch seems to have thought that rationale would have been better than the
one actually used by the Senate), but the quite different assertion of a Roman
right to territorial as well as maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean. To examine the full implications of this popular Roman view on the
course of Roman, and, indeed, world history, is far beyond the limits of this
study. For present purposes it seems enough to point out that "piracy" to the
Romans was a descriptive noun for the practices of a particular landbased
Eastern Mediterranean people whose views of law and intercommunity
relations appear to have reflected a millenium-Iong tradition that had become
an obstacle to Roman trade and inconsistent with Roman views of the world
order under Roman hegemony. The word did not imply criminality under any
legal system, Roman or law of nations. It was applied to a fully organized
society with families and a particular religious order that seems to have been
not shockingly different from the social organization and religious orders of
many other peoples of that time and place.
It is not beyond conjecture that something of this pattern was in the mind of
Sir T.S. Raffles when he called "piratical" some of the Malay sultanates with
which he had to deal in 1811.63
None of this is meant to imply that non-polis-connected marauding at sea,
what today might (or might not) be called "piracy" as a result oflater legal
developments, was permissable at Roman internal law, Roman imperial law
relating to hegemonial rights, if any, or international law as perceived by
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Roman statesmen. But those acts were called something else, and to analyze
the full range oflegal results that flowed from using those other labels would
involve a discussion beyond the limits of this study. To Europeans oflater
times whose education included familiarity with Greek and Latin writings in
which the words "peirato" and "pirata" or their derivatives were used, some
hint of the earlier meaning remained despite later legal uses of the word in
forms contemporary with the later Europeans in special legal contexts. And
that classical meaning did not carry the implication of criminality or violation
of general international law that other meanings carried; it justified a kind of
political action, perhaps, and also perhaps had some legal implication in
general international law particularly as it related to the laws of war and
postliminium. But these are factors better discussed later on.

The Reorganization of the Renaissance
"Piracy" Enters Vernacular English as "Privateering." For a thousand years
after Justinian the word "pirate" appears to have remained buried in the
Greek and Latin texts familiar to learned monks but not considered
significant to soldiers and statesmen. Norse raiders of the 9th to 11 th centuries
A.D. following a career that seems in many ways analogous to that of the
"pirates" of the time of Cicero and Pompey were not usually called "pirates"
in English or Latin in contemporary documents, but were called by the names
they gave themselves, "Danes" or "Vikings." Ranulf Higdon (or Higden)
wrote a general history of the world in Latin in the first half of the 14th
century, referred to by a Greek abbreviation for its long title as the
Polychronicon, that received some popularity for a century or so after its first
production in manuscript. In it he drew the obvious analogy, calling the
Vikings "Dani piratae." John de Trevisa, a don at Oxford 1362-1379, translated
Higdon into his native Middle English, translating the word "piratae" as "see
theves [sea thieves]." The earliest use of the word "pirate" in English found
by the compilers of the Oxford English Dictionary is in the second quarter of
the 15th century.64 That early usage seems to have no legal connotation.
Meantime, in the Mediterranean Sea area, the old Greek and Roman usages
seem to have survived. Merchant ships that passed near enough to fishing or
small agricultural villages of the Mediterranean to be safely attacked by the
inhabitants of those communities were, from time to time, attacked. The
dangers of trade and travel during the rise of Venice, the Crusades, the
establishment of the Ottoman Empire and the dominance of Suleiman the
Magnificent in 16th century Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean generally, and the establishment of stable Muslim rule in the maghrebi towns of
Algiers, Salee (Rabat), Tripoli and Tunis did not evoke images of "piracy" as
a violation of any law.
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Later writers have used the word "piracy," with its modern legal and
romantic connotations, in wholly misleading ways. As with later references
to "piracy" attributed to classical authors, the most eminent modern writers
have used the word to refer to a host of activities in the Mediterranean of the
16th and 17th centuries that mayor may not have been considered "piracy,"
or even wrongful under any legal system. The situation is summed up
admirably by Fernand Braudel, a French historian who himself uses the word
"piraterie" in the most confusingly vague and unhistorical ways:
In the 16th century [as in Homeric times] the sea was filled with pirates, and pirates
perhaps even more cruel than those of earlier days. Commerce raiding [fa course] takes a
mask, disguises itself as semi-official warfare, with letters of marque ...
I have repeatedly said that piracy was the child of the Mediterranean. True enough, but
historians have often lost sight of the generality of the practice while focusing their
attention and reproofs only on the Barbary corsairs. Their fate, which was grand,
overshadows the rest. Everything else is deformed. That which is called "piracy" when
done by the Barbary corsairs is called heroic, pure crusading spirit when done by the
Knights of Malta, and the equally ferocious Knights of St. Stephen, based at Pisa under
the protection of Cosimo dei Medici. 6S

Thus, while the picture painted by Braudel66 is brilliantly clear and
imaginative, the fact that he uses the word "pirate" to include licensed
warfare at sea should not be forgotten. He describes the Mediterranean of the
16th century as featuring: "Sea-pirates ... aided and abetted by powerful
towns and cities. Pirates on land, bandits, received regular backing from
nobles. "67 But the picture is actually, legally, one of lively and dangerous
commerce and conflicting claims to authority that might be called an
authority to tax nearby shipping lanes with capture of the vessel, confiscation
of its cargo, and the enslavement of the crew the penalty for tax evasion.
Another legal basis for "piracy" as the word is used by Braudel was the
medieval law of war: "One of the most profitable ventures of Christian
pirates in the Levant became the search of Venetian, Ragusan or Marseillais
vessels for Jewish merchandise, ... likening it to contraband, a convenient
pretext for the arbitrary confiscation of goods."68 The "Christian pirates"
referred to here seem to have been the Knights of Malta, a crusading Order
asserting sovereign rights to govern land and to participate in lawful war.69
For theft to be profitable, "stolen" goods must have a market. Where the
market is in the control of a "government," a person or body to whom is
conceded the legal power to change title to property, and a "taking" is
authorized by the proprietor of that market, it is difficult to conceive of
"stealing" as distinct from "lawful capture" or "taxation." By the end of the
sixteenth century such markets were flourishing in Valetta (Malta), Leghorn
(Livorno, Italy) and Algiers. Their legal basis was thus the law of the
Christian Knights of Malta, Cosimo de' Medici, and the Muslim Governor
(under Turkish control) of Algiers. 70
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For the pattern of conunerce to be profitable the goods must continue to
flow; the taxation or belligerent interdiction (or robbery) must not be so
burdensome as to drive trade away; even risk-sharing through insurance must be
managed in such a way that the risk does not become so great as to be
uninsurable. 71 Examining this economic reality and the undeniable vitality of
Mediterranean trade in the period 1580-1648, when captures at sea were most
vigorously condemned by European writers as intolerable, even iflegal, it can
be conjectured that the forcible exchange of goods and slave-taking was in fact a
tolerable part of the economic system of the Mediterranean at that period.
Indeed, even a century later, the risk of being taken as a slave in the waters near
Algiers and Morocco was significant, and the fate of the slave once taken was
not always as grim as might be assumed by a 20th century reader.'72
England was already a major sea power by the time the Spanish Armada
was defeated in 1588, soon to dominate large areas of the sea and express
through the application of force its sentiments as to the proper order of
conunerce and private property.
John Chamberlain, whose letters written 1597 to 1626 constitute a major
source of insight into the trade and politics of that period in England,
apparently uses the word "piracies" as a synonym for "privateering under
license" in a letter to Dudley Carleton dated 31 January 1599: "Upon the
Duke of Florence's embargo and complaint of our piracies, here is order upon
pain of death that no prizes be taken in the Levant seas. "73 A similar usage
appears thirteen years later when Chamberlain refers to unlicensed takings as
a matter of state authority bearing no apparent relationship to abstract
notions of morality or international law: "Many of our pirates are come home
upon their pardon for life and goods, but the greater part stand still aloof in
Ireland, because they are not offered the same conditions, but only life ... "74
The same usage was applied to Algiers and Tunis, whose licensed or
unlicensed prize-takers were called "pirates" while routine treaty negotiations were conducted with the rulers of those places.
Sir Thomas Roe had taken great pains and thought he had done a chef d'oeuvre in
concluding a truce or peace for our merchants with the pirates of Algiers and Tunis. But
he is in danger to be disavowed and all this labor lost (howsoever it comes about) and we
left to the mercy of those miscreants who have already seven or eight hundred of our
able mariners, among whom many gunners and men of best service at sea, who by this
treaty should have been delivered. 75

About the beginning of the 17th century "pirates" began to take the place
of "Spaniards " as the villains in English popular ballads. A ballad published in
1609 condemning John Ward and a Dutchman named Simon Danseker for
their villainies under Barbary license illustrates the changing mood:
Gallants, you must understand,
Captain Ward of England,
A pyrate and a rover on the sea,
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late a simple fishennan
In the merry town of Feversham,
Grows famous in the world now every day.
Men of his own country
He still abuses vilely;
Some back to back are cast into the waves;
Some are hewn in pieces small,
Some are shot against a wall;
A slender number of their lives he saves.
At Tunis in Barbary
Now he buildeth stately -~
A gallant palace and a royal place,
Decked with delights most trim,
Fitter for a prince than him,
To which at last will prove to his disgrace.
There is not·any Kingdom,
In Turkey or in Christendom
But by these pyrates [Ward and Danseker] have
received loss;
Merchant-men of every land
Do daily in great danger stand,
And fear do much the ocean main to cross
But their cursed villanies,
And their bloody pyracies,
Are chiefly bent against our Christian friends;
Some Christians so delight in evils
That they become the sons of divels,
And for the same have many shameful ends.
London's Elizabeth
Of late these rovers taken hath,
A ship well laden with rich merchandize;
The nimble Pearl and Charity,
All ships of gallant bravery,
Are by these pyrates made a lawful prize.

The ballad ends with three more verses describing a quarrel between Ward
and Danseker, and seeing in their separation, Ward to stay near Tunis and
Danseker to hover near "Argier" (Algiers), the hand of God which will lead
to their overthrow.76
The realities reflected on this ballad led to a diplomatic expedition to
Algiers in 1621 under Sir Robert Mansell, which failed,77 and an unsuccessful
attempt by Parliament to ransom 1500 Christian captives in 1624. Popular
indignation over the plight of the captives is reflected in a frankly polemical
ballad of that year:
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Not many moones have from their silver bowes
Shot light through all the world, since those sworne foes
To God and all good men ... [sic] that hell-borne crew
Of Pirates (to whome there's no villanies new),
Those halfe-Turkes and halfe Christians, who now ride
Like sea-gods (on rough billows in their pride),
Those renegadoes, who (their Christ denying)
Are worse than Turkes ...78

In 1637, 3-400 souls were taken from Salee by the English ship Rainborow,
apparently peacefully.79
The English conception of when the word "pirate" was appropriate in
international relations at this period had not come to be stably reflected in a
specific legal context. 80 As is apparent from the last quoted line of the ballad
of Ward and Danseker, at least in the popular mind there was no distinction
between privateering and "piracy;" a "pyrate" could make "lawful prize" of
a captured vessel. It is possible, although not entirely clear, that the word was
a pejorative used for privateers of any nationality who captured English
vessels. The word appears to have slipped so quickly into the general
pejorative vocabulary that whatever legal precision it might have derived
from classical sources eroded by the late 16th century.
Some clues as to the evolving meaning of the word, and some insight into
the pattern of governance and trade that gave rise to the changes in meaning,
are implicit in contemporary documents relating to the East India Company's
business in Southeast Asia. There are mentions, for example, of English and
Dutch ships in 1622, during one of the very brief periods of cooperation
between the merchants of the two nations, keeping company "for fear of
pirates" near Java, but it is unclear precisely who or where the "pirates"
were. 81 Similarly there is mention in December 1623 in a communication
from the Council at Batavia to the English merchants atJambi (in Sumatra)
that it is deemed "dangerous to send one ship for England alone, because of
the abundance of pirates lurking in all places, "82 and a few days later the same
Council referred to the need for homeward-bound ships to be prepared
"against the invasion of that cursed crew of pirates."83 Again, it is unclear
precisely who or where the "pirates" were, but they were probably not the
Dutch; there is a reference in instructions given to an English trading voyage
to Bantam (in Java) by the "President and Council of Defence" in Batavia on
16 August 1623 to the need to defend against an assault by the Dutch "as from
pirates,"84 apparently distinguishing between the two threats.
King James I, convinced that the East India Company was withholding
from the Admiralty its tenth share of prize money taken under license by the
Company as "reprizals" (apparently against Portugal), is reported to have
called the Company itself "pirates. "85 In the Court Minutes of the East India
Company the same transaction is explained:
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... Mr. Governor replied that upon receipt of the release promised for the time past and
the warrant and direction for the future they were ready to pay the money. His
Majesty's answer was that this was to give them leave to be pirates; the answer was that
the Company delighted neither in blood nor rapine, and therefore humbly besought his
Majesty would be a means that peace might be between the English and PortugaIs ... or
else that his Majesty would explain in what cases the English might defend themselves
by offending others if there were cause. 56

It seems likely that two different conceptions of "piracy " were involved, one

asserted by the Company referred to "blood" and "rapine" and seems to
relate to English criminal law as it might be applied generically to robbery
within the jurisdiction of the Admiral; the other implied by King James I
reIated to any unlicensed taking. It is tempting in this to see a Stuart King
seeking a legal basis for classifying as criminals those who merely failed to
submit to total centralized control over their activities, and a private
Company seeking to restrict royal control to what was permitted by
Parliament in its criminal statutes. But, as shall be seen below, the dispute
probably reflects differing conceptions of law on a much deeper level.
It does seem to be concluded by all who have examined the facts of
Mediterranean commerce in the 16th and 17th centuries that licensed
"privateering" of many European powers, including England, made trade
not only in the Mediterranean but also in the North Atlantic and elsewhere,
hazardous for all traders of any nationality, and that the four Barbary
communities of Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers and Salee joined in this practice in the
early 17th century.87 The word "piracy" was used increasingly around the
turn of the 17th century to refer to privateering, possibly by analogy to the
classical "pirates" of Cilicia in the Eastern Mediterranean, but the word was
assuming a more specific meaning related to unlicensed "privateering" as the
century progressed.

"Piracy" Enters the Legal Vocabulary as "Outlawry." The professional
international law scholars of the 16th and 17th century left in their writings
evidence of this evolution of meaning, and how the word "piracy" acquired
technical international legal meanings reflecting the popular culture.
The North Italian Pierino Belli, publishing his major work on military
subjects and war in 1563, rests on the medieval post-glossator Baldus Ubaldus
(1327-1400) as authority for interpreting Cicero's and Plutarch's writings to
mean that while war should not be begun without a declaration, "it is
customary to make an exception in the case of pirates [piratae], since they are
both technically and in fact already at war; for people whose hand is against
every man should expect a like return from all men, and it should be
permissible for anyone to attack them. "88 He distinguishes "pirates,"
towards whom the laws of war apply, from persons whom the Pope or Holy
Roman Emperor have branded as public enemies; public enemies, but not
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"pirates," are termed "outlaws" whom even persons without soldiers'
licenses may kill. 89 But Belli makes a major departure from precedent when
repeating Cicero's condemnation of Marc Antony's agreement with the
Cilician "pirates" in 44 B. C. 90 as if applicable in all contexts and disregarding
any evidence that treaties with the Cilician "pirates" had in fact been
concluded and observed by Pompey as well as by Marc Antony. Indeed, the
inconsistency between the two passages in Belli, one affirming the
applicability of the law of war to relations with "pirates" and the other
asserting a rule of law that would make the termination of that war
impossible except by the complete annihilation of the "pirates," seems to
reflect some confusion of thought.
Balthasar de Ayala, a native of Antwerp (now part of Belgium, then part of
the provinces of the Habsburg monarchy ruled from Spain) writing in 1581
carried the confusion a step further. By reading the passages of]ustinian's Digest
relating to captivity and postliminium as if all references to "brigands"
("latrones") applied equally to "pirates," he actually denied the status oflawful
enemy ("hostes") to pirates in apparent disregard of all the ancient writings:
For the same reason, the laws of war and of captivity and of postliminy, which apply to
enemies, do not apply to rebels, any more than they apply to pirates [piratis] and robbers
(these not being included in the term "enemy"). Our meaning is that these persons
themselves can not proceed under the laws of war and so, e.g., they do not acquire the
ownership of what they capture, this only being admitted in the case of enemies; but all
the modes ofstress known to the laws of war may be employed against them, even more
than in the case of enemies, for the rebel and the robber merit severer reprobation than
an enemy who is carrying on a regular and just war and their condition ought not to be
better than his. 91

Nor is it clear why he denied the status oflawful enemy to rebels, although
legally the case for criminality was easier to make regarding "rebels" than
"pirates" in 1581, since rebellion wp's obviously a violation of the law of the
monarch against whom it was aimed, and was committed by people within
the "allegiance," of that monarch, while "pirates" were beyond the reach of
municipal law under normal feudal concepts. The possibility that rebels
might achieve an independent status under international law before the
former monarch accepts that negation of his monarchy's internal law, and
thus become best viewed as entitled to the protection international law gives
to lawful belligerents even if their precise status is doubtful, was not
considered by Ayala. Perhaps his views were influenced by loyalty to the
Habsburg monarchy during the violent days of the rise of the Dutch
Republic. 92
The Legal Order and Outlawry
Positivist Theory: Law as a Support for Policy. The first writer of
lasting eminence to convert the confusions of the time to legal principle, to
argue that the label "pirate" carries with it unmistakably the meaning of
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outlawry and that what "pirates" do is forbidden by international law, was
Alberico Gentili. Born in Italy in 1552, but forced by the Inquisition to leave
when his father, and apparently he himself, converted to the Protestant
religion in the 1570s, Gentili settled in England in 1580 and was appointed to a
teaching post at the University of Oxford in 1581. He was made Regius
Professor of Civil Law there in 1587 and published the first volume of his
Commentaries on the Law of War in 1588. Two other volumes followed in 1589,
and all three were reissued together in 1598. He appeared with Royal
permission as the advocate for Spain in several cases before the Royal Council
Chamber in London, dying in 1608 full ofhonors. 93
After defining the legal state of war ("Bellum est") as a ''just [lawful?] and
public contest of arms [publicorum armorum iusta contentio], "94 and asserting on
the basis of quotations from Justinian's Digest that only Princes have the legal
power to resort to war,95 Gentili devotes an entire chapter to demonstrating
by legal logic that "pirates" cannot be public enemies; cannot wage "war. "96
"A state of war cannot exist with pirates and robbers, in the opinion of
Pomponius and Ulpian [cum piratis & latrunculis bellum non est. vt ita Pomponius, &
Ulpianus definierunt]. "97 He goes on: "Pirates are the common enemies of all
mankind, and therefore Cicero says that the laws of war cannot apply to
them. "98 But the passage Gentili immediately quotes from Cicero does not
mention "pirata" or any of its derivatives or the law of war; it is a passage
relating only to promises given to "praedones."99
It is, of course, possible to quote the entire chapter, but it is not the function
of this study to subject to critical analysis the influential scholarship of others
except as necessary to trace the evolution and legal meaning of the concept of
"piracy" in modern international law. Thus, without further examples, it is
possible to conclude that Gentili in 1588 took an argumentative position,
supported with an advocate's brief, that "piracy" was not a matter of
permanent war with communities pursuing violent tax collections at sea or
basing part of their economy on booty seized from their neighbors. "Piracy"
to Gentili was apparently any taking of foreign life or property not
authorized by a sovereign, synonymous with brigandage or robbery on land,
i.e., that his conception of the criminal law implications of the words praedones
and latrones or latrunculi in Roman law, which he does not analyze, applied
equally to "pirates" without analysis.
It seems clear that the license of an established sovereign was the key to his
thinking. The chapter concludes with a famous example illustrating precisely
that:
But what a~e we to think about those Frenchmen who were captured by the Spaniards in
the last war with Portugal and were not treated as lawful enemies: They were treated as
pirates (pirataeJ, since they served Antonio, who had been driven from the whole
kingdom and never recognized as king by the Spaniards. But history itself proves that
they were not pirates (piratas J and I say this because of no argument derived from the
number and quality of the men and ships, but from the letters of their king which they
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exhibited; and it was that king whom they served, not Antonio, although this was
especially for the interest of Antonio: a consideration, however, which did not affect
their status.I OO

The implications of Gentili's position were great. If it were generally
accepted, whatever the weaknesses of the appeal to classical writings in
support of it, that all takings were in some sense "criminal" unless authorized
by a person whose legal power to issue such an authorization were
acknowledged, no degree of political organization or goal could make a
"rebel" into a lawful combatant or require the application of the laws of war
to the struggle against the rebel army. A tool of enormous power was placed
in the hands of "sovereigns." The political struggle to unify France and to
engorge the royal power of the Stuart kings of England would be helped.
Moreover, each "sovereign" would seem to be accorded the legal power, by
"recognizing" anybody's legal status needed to license privateers or naval
commanders (or withholding that "recognition"), to determine what legal
-regime would be applied to any struggle between the "sovereign" and an
enemy of uncertain status. The Barbary states could be rendered "piratical"
by simply withholding recognition of his governmental position from a new
Dey or "recognizing" a rival, thus depriving the one not liked of the power to
issue the Turkish equivalent of letters of marque and reprisal. Gentili's
approach was clearly attractive to him as an advocate for Spain in England
1605-1608.101
Many of the cases in which Gentili was concerned involved "postliminy"
in its renaissance form, the determination of title to goods and status of
persons taken by a foreign sovereign, his agent, or a "privateer" (or "pirate")
possibly acting in excess of his foreign license. While it is not necessary for
purposes of this study to set out the complexities of the Roman law of
postliminium, a few words as to its growing importance in renaissance
Europe seem needed.
Some Technicalities: Property Law and Privateering. "Postliminium"
was the Roman law word of art to denote that branch of the law which dealt
with rights of property during wartime. Questions involved primarily the
status of persons (slave or free) captured in war and brought to the territory of
a neutral before the war ended; would it be unneutral of the third country to
deny the property right of the captor in his slave? If so, could the captor sell
the slave and pass title to a neutral? And if that neutral sold the slave to a buyer
from his original country, what then; would the captive soldier become a
slave in his own country? The analogy to captured goods and vessels seems
clear.
By late medieval times, the legal status of war, retaining some of its
religious background, no longer applied to many lawful private takings. It
was, in fact, in an effort to avoid bringing about a state of war between
princes that letters of marque and reprisal were issued to private persons
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authorizing them to recapture from foreigners goods that had been
wrongfully taken by those foreigners. There were no judicial proceedings
prior to the issuance of the letters, thus there could be, and presumably were,
serious questions about the "wrongfulness" of the original taking and the
propriety of the supposed "recapture." Moreover, it was rarely possible to
assure that the goods "recaptured" were identical with the goods originally
taken, and it was but a small step to issue letters of marque and reprisal
(" licentia marcandi" in 1295) for the taking not necessarily of the original goods,
but of any goods up to the value of the original goods; and not necessarily
from the original taker, but from his fellow-citizen. 102
Little help in determining the precise meaning and origin of the system
exists in etymology. "Reprisal" comes from Latin via French and means
"re-taking." It is possible to speculate that the original sense in law involved
simply an authority to recapture goods wrongfully taken by another.
"Marque" seems to have an obscure origin and some relationship to the
technical old Proven~allaw of pledge. It has no English usage other than in
"Letters of Marque" and almost always the words "marque and reprisal"
appear together. On the other hand, as noted above, the phrase "licentia
marcandi," clearly meaning a letter authorizing a taking in the sense of "letters
of marque and reprisal," appears in a document of 1295, and the phrase
"marquandi sue gagiandi" in an English legal document of 1293, predating by
some sixty years the earliest reference to "la lei de Mark & de represailles" found
by the compilers of the Oxford English Dictionary in an English statute of
1354. The word "marquandi" seems to relate not to seizures and pledges but to
merchantability; the legal power to pass title to goods. 103
These shifts in the system of private "reprisal" and equivalent capture for
sale to satisfy the original claim in money terms by the end of the 16th century
had failed of their purpose to avoid war between the sovereigns over private
claims. The issuance of such letters had begun to be regarded in Northern
Europe as necessarily involving the centralizing monarchies in the attack on
foreigners whom it was the legal duty of their own sovereigns to protect.
Thus, the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal was becoming itself a
belligerent act, justifiable only by the law of war. The old forms persisted,
and it was apparently felt not necessary that the war be declared before the
letters were issued, while it was felt to be necessary to apply the laws of war
to determine the lawfulness of the capture. Thus the license, the letters, held
by the captor were felt to be subject to examination and the legal status of the
foreign "sovereign" issuing an equivalent license could be called into
question. The question would arise whenever goods or a ship purchased in
Algiers or Tunis arrived in England or Holland, for example, and some
former owner identified it as his. This was often done in the case of a ship;
Admiralty proceedings to determine rights in a vessel became the typical
forum for hearing questions of this sort. Thus, while "prize courts" in any
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country l04 might deal with wartime captures, and the Royal Council
Chamber in England dealt with various claims involving the dignity of the
Crown in the early 17th century, ordinary Admiralty courts in England dealt
with a variety of cases arising out of peacetime capture under letters of
marque and reprisal.
The proceedings in Admiralty, Royal Chamber and Prize were proceedings
before national courts; i.e., only the sovereign could authorize an adjudication
of property rights within his domain, so all the courts there, whatever their
title or form, derived from him their authority to adjudicate title to property.
But the substantive law they applied was necessarily a law that had to be
acceptable both at home and, if the new title were to be of any use to the
winner of the case, abroad. Thus rationales or, probably more accurately,
justifications based on legal logic and precedent for the determinations of the
tribunal, had to be found in terms that would seem persuasive to the tribunals
erected by foreign sovereigns dealing with the same or similar cases. This
pattern of logic and the appeal to precedent based on incidents not tied to
local circumstances and legislation might be best described as the application
of "international law" to the case, or of a special branch of municipal law, or
even as a sort of conflict oflaws situation where the municipal hiw refers the
tribunal to a foreign system oflaws (in this case "international law") which in
turn refers the questions of title to a foreign law (perhaps the law of Tunis in
the case of a Tunisian capture followed by legal proceedings equivalent to
Prize or Admiralty or Royal Chamber proceedings in Tunis). Which set of
concepts was used would depend on the complexity of the mind of the analyst
and the consistency of the particular legal model with other legal principles
important to the tribunaL
Gentili, as the Advocate of Spanish interests in England at the highest legal
levels, apparently phrased his pleadings, when he could, as pleadings on behalf
of English merchants deriving title through Spanish claimants, and seems
frequently to have omitted the Spanish middle step. Thus, where he argued on
behalf of English merchants against other English merchants, he was actually
doing his proper jobof representing Spanish interests. Where he could, he also
described the interests of the other side as foreign, even where it seems likely
that they were as deeply (or as shallowly) rooted in England as his own side's
were.
In the first cases in his book of pleadings, Gentili argued that the Roman
writers and precedents created a law of "postliminy" that should be applied
in the Royal Chamber to permit lawful title to pass to a captor only as a result
of lawful capture during time of war, and then only after the capture is
perfected by the captive people, goods or vessel being brought to the territory
controlled by the capturing person's sovereign and the capture declared good
there. He noted, as if merely in passing, that "To Pirates and wild beasts no
territory offers safety [Piratis, & jeris territorium nullum praebet securitatem]"

24

The Law of Piracy

because "Pirates are the enemies of all men [Piratae sunt hostes omnium]"lOS and
cannot perfect their captures any more than wild beasts can. In a case
involving a purchase by English merchants directly from "pirates" in a
market under the supervision of the treasury officials of the "King of
Barbary," Gentili argued that the Roman law forbidding pirates to alter title
(he did not distinguish between title to persons and title to goods) applied i:a
Barbary as it applied in Turkey, the territorial descendant of the Eastern
Roman Empire of which Justinian was' Emperor. That law, he argued,
nullified the purported legal effects of the English purchase even though there
was some official Barbary connection with the sale. As an additional reason in
policy for adopting the legal pattern he proposed, he argued that a contrary
result would give to "pirates" a "very convenient place, which is quite close
to the Spanish lines of trade and occupied by English merchants, where they
may distribute their booty among their confederates. Does this make for
trade? "106
On the other side, when attempting to support title derived by purchase in
Tunis from "pirates" against the Venetian original owners, he argued that
there are exceptions to the absolute rules. Under one such exception at
Roman law the payer of a ransom to pirates could hold the persons ransomed
until repaid the amount of the ransom; rights of possession might thus be
passed by pirates even if full rights of property could not. 107 It is not clear just
who the" pirates" were (they were asserted to be English) or what they did or
if they had any letters from a foreign prince. Since they were not parties to the
case,. and Gentili's argument did not rest on asserting the legitimacy of their
acts (which might have been conformable to international law but forbidden
by English municipal law under some special definition of "piracy")108 these
issues were not presented.
Finally, in a case involving English possessors of "pirate" property deriving
their title through purchase at Tunis, with Gentili arguing for the English
possessors, he was forced to depart still further from his theoretical position
that the Barbary states were "piratical" when they licensed takings without
going to war. Admitting that his former argument109 went the other way, he
tried to distinguish the cases on the ground that the involvement of the
Turkish Treasury (''fiscus'') in the first case was merely a matter of form
while in this case the involvement was direct. But major stress is placed on a
more solid policy ground: That those who are safe under the law of the place
of the transaction must be safe in their rights in England also. This is a basic
principle of conflict of laws and necessary for any country involved in
international trade. It thus indicates a limit to the theoretical discretion of
lawyers and statesmen to attach legal labels to suit the particular interest of
the moment. Gentili went even further: "Our countrymen have their trade
with Tunis, Algeria, and many another state taken from th~m by this claim of
the Venetians that those states are nothing but piratical retreats and that there
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is none in them but pirates and that the very magistrates in them are pirates
too. "110 This frankly political argument for attaching the label "state" to the
Barbary organizations, and "government" to their officials, is consistent
with Gentili's basic idea: That legal labels are attached not on the basis of
facts, but on the basis of their legal and political results by a policy choice.
Thus Gentili's "recognition" approach had its limits. Reality and the needs
of commerce exposed it as not a rule for judgment by a third party or scholar,
but as a tool of advocacy attractive primarily to flexible-minded lawyers and
statesmen seeking a justification for actions that might not stand moral
scrutiny.
It was not even clear that the Gentili approach would help "legitimate"
monarchs dispose of rebels as "pirates." Not only was its legal basis shaky, but
it was not clear politically that treating a dynastic claimant as a "pirate" chief
would have any significant effect in the world of affairs. It was not clear, as it
is not clear today, that the legal results of loss in war are less harsh on the
vanquished than defeat as "pirates." Hanging for treason, for political
convenience or influence, or for crime differ as far as the victim is concerned
only to the degree that some sense of dignity might attach more easily to the
political prisoner than to the common criminal. Yet, it has been common in all
ages that political prisoners suffer far more than common criminals in times of
stress. And if the alternative to fighting on in a hopeless cause was to be death
on a criminal's scaffold, it is not clear that calling "piracy" what others might
call "privateering licensed by an unrecognized sovereign" would always
shorten the struggle or make victory easier for the established sovereign.
Thus the particular example does not seem to support the principle Gentili
argued to underlie it.
There are other implications to Gentili's approach. His approach to "law"
seems dominated by the ephemora of policy. If "piracy" is criminal, by what
law? Apparently, by giving to each sovereign the power by "recognition" or
"non-recognition" to classify belligerent behavior as "piracy" when engaged
in by licensees of a foreign government or of a political movement whose
status could be denied, the privateers or soldiers of that government or
movement could be subjected not to international law, but to the domestic
("municipal," to use the usual word of art) criminal law of the "nonrecognizing" sovereign. In theory, Gentili's approach, based on an advocate's
twist to Roman municipal law, reached the same position as was condemned
by Plutarch when considering the authority the Senate had given Pompey to
suppress the Cilician "pirates" in 68 B.C. Now any sovereign could extend
his municipal law to the high seas, and possibly even to foreign land, by
authorizing his Admiral or General or other delegate to wipe out the
"pirates" there. Clearly, this broad authority would not survive the politics
of Europe, where the extension of one state's municipal law to the land
claimed by another would result either in a system of competing empires and
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"war" unmodified by the humanitarian and chivalrous law of war that was
generally acknowledged in Europe as necessary, or in the acknowledgment
that a European sovereign of sufficient political power and a claim to
authority along traditional lines could not be properly denied "recognition"
as such. But outside of Europe, where the competition for empire among
European sovereigns and their subjects was becoming intense, the claims of
non-European rulers to the legal authority of a European sovereign could be
denied without those implications. And if the struggle grew too difficult to
manage or the non-European too strong to ignore as a political actor or too
adept at finding European allies who would "recognize" his legal capacity to
license soldiers and privateers, the European power that had overextended
itselfby abusing the legal tools Gentili would place in its control could simply
withdraw for a while to reconsider the politics and law of its position. 111
The vistas opened by Gentili's discovery in the ancient Roman law relating
to latrones and praedones of a pattern of rules that could justify the most extreme
action against non-European political societies, and against internal forces
resisting the move towards centralized control in the monarchies and
bureaucracies of European expansion, were immense and very attractive to
the rising merchant classes.
Naturalist Theory: Law as a Moral Order Governing Policy. Gentili's
approach was not universally adopted by scholars. Hugo Grotius (Huigh de
Groot) was a Dutch prodigy whose reformulation of the basic conceptions of
the law that governs relations among states was so influential that he became
known as the father of modern international law. Born in 1583, he began
University studies at Leyden eleven years later, received his Doctorate at
fifteen from the University of Orleans while accompanying Johan van
Oldenbarnevelt on a diplomatic mission, and was greeted on that occasion by
King Henri IV as "The miracle of Holland. "112 The first edition of his
masterwork, On the Law of War and Peace, was published in France in 1625 and
incorporates writings dating back to 1604. Later editions with his own
corrections in them appeared in 1631, 1632, 1642 and 1646, the last being
published posthumously.ll3 His active life included government service in
many capacities, including Ambassador from Queen Christina of Sweden to
France in 1634-1645,114 and the 1646 edition of On the Law of War and Peace
incorporates not only vast classical scholarship and literary precision, but
distills the experience of an active statesman deeply involved in the political
struggles of his time.
Without mentioning Gentili by name, Grotius took issue with him on at
least two vital points: (1) His classical scholarship, which Grotius corrected in
large part; and (2) his emphasis on the power of an established sovereign
through non-recognition to place an active political community within the
legal classification "pirate." Most importantly, by describing some characteristics of "pirates, "Grotius implied a view of the legal order which permits an
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objective classification; he indirectly created a definition of "pirate"
quite different from the Gentili definition and equally influential in the
long run.
As to the disagreements, Grotius addressed the same preliminary question
that Gentili addressed as to whether "war" was a fitting legal classification
for all armed contentions. Quoting Pomponius and Ulpian among others,
Grotius came to no sweeping conclusions regarding "pirates" on the basis of
their opinions. Instead, he turned to a more direct analysis of the characteristics of a society before it should be denominated "piratical," asserting that
the label properly fits only those who are banded together for wrongdoing
but does not include societies formed for other reasons even if also
committing illegal acts. ll5
Moreover, a commonwealth or state to Grotius did not immediately cease
to be such if it commited an illegality, even as a body; and a gathering of
pirates and brigands was not a state, even if they did perhaps mutually
maintain a sort of equality. The reason, according to Grotius, is that pirates
and brigands are banded together for wrongdoing; the members of a state,
even if at times they are not free from crime, nevertheless have been united
for the enjoyment of rights, and they do render justice to foreigners. 116 The
problem comes in practice when trying to distinguish a "piratical"
community from a wrong-doing state. Comparing Ulpian's conclusions
about captives not losing their liberty if taken by brigands117 with the
willingness ofUlpian to allow lawful capture to German marauding tribes on
land as described in the works of Caesar and Tacitus,11S and comparing the
celebration of a Roman "Triumph" at the end of the "war" with Illyrian
indiscriminate sea-borne marauders with the refusal of Rome to order a
Triumph to end Pompey's aGknowledged war with the Cilician "pirates, "119
Grotius simply reiterated his view that these legally vital distinctions which,
after all, determine rights to potentially large amounts of captured property120
and the liberty of real people, rest solely on the criminal purpose of the
marauders' association. 121
This basis for discriminating between "piratical" and non-piratical
marauding communities in the classical literature seems insupportable. There
is no evidence that the "peiraton" of Plutarch and Polybius, with their villages,
religious observances, alliances, etc., were banded together for the purpose of
plundering their neighbors any more than were the Germanic tribes or
Illyrians. Moreover, Grotius himself saw that the distinction could not
survive close legal scrutiny or the need politically to take full account of
marauding societies no matter what the purpose of their original union, once
their activities and degree of organization and their political power passed a
certain point. He argued that a "transformation [mutatio]" may take place
with regard to individual chieftains of brigand bands [praedonum ducibus] who
become "lawful chiefs Uusti duces]" in some cases,l22 and also to whole
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communities by mere evolution. l23 But, instead of reconsidering his definition
Grotius immediately passed on to other things. 124
In short, Grotius's conception of when the word "pirate" would fit as a
legal word of art seems to focus not on recognition or the derivation of
authority from some acknowledged prince, but from facts directly: The word
would fit robber bands on sea or land; it would not fit the Barbary states or
other complete communities, whose primary purpose of association is lawful,
i.e., defense, raising families, making war. The legal results that flow from
attaching the word seem vague indeed, since Grotius would allow oaths and
promises to "pirates" to be kept and legation to be maintained. The only
really significant passage then is the one offhandedly expanding the Justinian
Digest's rule regarding the impossibility of a piratical capture changing the
personal status of the captive, to the very important area of general
postliminium-the disposition after recovery of goods previously captured
by "pirates."
Even in this last regard, postliminy, Grotius was not certain that its rules
and exceptions had any application to his time. The expansion of organized
political societies in peaceful contact with each other had, in his optimistic
view, made the Roman law of postliminy obsolete: A lawful capture in war
followed by prize proceedings would legally change title to captured goods;
an unlawful capture in war or the lack of a legal proceeding similar to prize
court proceedings in which the various claimants to the goods would have an
opportunity to dispute the lawfulness of the capture, the contraband nature of
the goods and their actual ownership and destination, would not change the
title, and the loser could reclaim his goods if he could in fact recover them. A
lawful capture outside of war he regarded as impossible.
But what, then, about seizures by the Barbary corsairs? Were those
"states" in a permanent status of war with the states of Europe? Could their
licensees' seizures and their magistrates' legal procedures confer title on the
corsairs and thus on the European merchants who eventually bought the
goods? Or were they "pirates" who, by the ancient Roman law, could not get
title to goods however elaborate their legal proceedings? Or were they
"states" not at war whose depredations could give them some rights of
possession, but with regard to whom the law of postliminy should be revived
to clarify precisely what those rights were and against whom they could be
asserted? Grotius reported without comment a judgment of the highest court
in Paris delivered while he was writing (presumably shortly before 1625):
The decision held that goods which had belonged to French citizens, and had been
captured by the Algerians, a people accustomed in their maritime depredations to attack
all others, had changed ownership by the law of war, and therefore, when recaptured by
others, became the property of those who had recovered them.125

Despite Grotius's seeming to doubt the legal strength or practical wisdom of
the Paris decision, and bearing in mind that his merely recording it added
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greatly to its weight in those days when there were no formal court reports
and a necessarily different concept of stare decisis, (i.e., the bindingness of
common law decisions on later courts) from the current concept, the
inclusion of this judgment in his book may indicate Grotius's own uneasiness
with the classifications that his logic and moral perception of the legal order
had led him to. Of course, if there were no moral content to the law but only
form, the decision was clearly correct: Algiers met the criteria of statehood
by Grotius's own definitions,-and the procedures oflegal title transfer by the
law of Algiers were not questionedtlMoreover, presumably both the former
owner and the owner deriving title through the sale in Algiers were innocent
of the taking and certainty in the law seems always to have been more
important for practical men of affairs and merchants than its conformity to an
abstract ideal of morality; a decision against Algiers would have had to come
in the form of a decision against a merchant who presumably had his insurance
or other 17th century risk-sharing arrangement to fall back on. It is only the
moral feeling that such takings seemed more like robbery than like war or tax
enforcement that seemed bothersome, and that sense of wrong came from an
analogy to the municipal law of robbery that seems misplaced in an age when
privateering was the normal way to recover the loss due to the acts of
foreigners abroad. Perhaps there was an undercurrent of yearning for
Empire, the imposition o~ Dutch order on the world, or at least on the
non-European part of it. \ Perhaps it was a deeper sense of order felt
increasingly as the excitement of trade and travel combined with classical
learning began to stir European scholars. But this is speculation.
The practical diplomat's position expressed by implication throughout De
Jure Belli ac Pacis, that facts and the needs of politics and moral order dictate the
legal classifications that must be attached to situations, contrasts strongly
with Gentili's position that lawyers and politicians can apply the labels best
suited to their legal and political needs by a simple exercise of will. Under
Grotius's analysis, rebels at a fairly early stage, when their independent
existence at least as a community capable of belligerency could be objectively
determined, must be treated as a legal entity exercising belligerent rights
under international law. That position, of course, suited very well the
position of the Netherlands rebelling from Spain. Gentili, the Spanish
advocate in London's Royal Council Chamber sitting in Admiralty insisted
that only a license from a recognized sovereign could authorize the exercise
of soldiers' or privateers' privileges, thus that legitimate sovereigns
attempting to suppress rebellion could treat the rebels as criminals, even
"pirates," with whatever legal results could be drawn from that classification, without raising any questions of international law.
Under the analyses of both Grotius and Gentili, robber bands not
purporting to have any license could be treated as "pirates," but the legal
result of this was not to treat "pirates" directly as Roman law "latrones" or
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"praedones." It was to justify attaching the label "pirate" to those robber
bands that would have been called "latrones" or "praedones," but not "pirata,"
before the great reanalysis of the late 16th century. Whatever the Roman law
treatment of "latrones" and "praedones," the effect of this was to refer the
treatment of those now called "pirates" back to the municipal law systems of
the labeling states, presumably by unconscious analogy to the primacy of
Roman municipal criminal law in questions involving the disposition of those
whom the Roman law called "latrones" or "praedones."
There is another aspect to the Grotian view of the international society of
the time that must be mentioned. Despite Grotius's reputation as an able
advocate for seas open to all,l26 in De Jure Belli ac Pads the more extreme
arguments, under which Portuguese monopoly treaties with the Sultans of the
Malay Archipelago and their enforcement against third states were
denominated criminal,127 were dropped and Grotius concluded that:
[SJovereignty over a part of the sea is acquired in the same way as sovereignty
elsewhere, that is, ... through the instrumentality of persons and of territory. It is
gained through the instrumentality of persons if, for example, a fleet, which is an army
afloat, is stationed at some point of the sea; by means of territory, insofar as those who
sail over the part of the sea along the coast may be constrained from the land no less than
if they should be upon the land itself.128

Thus the basis for the extension of municipal criminal law to the activities of
foreigners on at least parts of the sea was laid in theory. The theory was that
of effective occupation-the power in fact of a sovereign to dominate a part
of the sea and apply his law there as he did on land; a power that could be
exercised not by theoretical claims, but by the use of military force.
Argumentative support for this position was found in various Greek and
Roman precedents,129 although the example of the Roman Senate conferring
monarchical powers on Pompey in 68 B.C. is not cited. Thus, as Gentili had
found a legal rationale for the extension of municipal law to foreign territory,
so Grotius, reversing his earlier position as the sea power of The Netherlands
increased, found a rationale for the extension of municipal law by any state
with a warship to that part of the sea within the military control of that
warship.
Some Implications. It may thus be seen that the word "piracy" entered
modern English usage in a vernacular sense to cover almost any interference
with property rights, whether licensed or not, and was applied as a pejorative
with political implications but no clear legal meaning. The word in its Latin
form entered the vocabulary of lawyers concerned with public order in the
late 16th and early 17th century as a synonym for action, whether or not
related to property rights, which was conceived to be unauthorized within
the legal system posited by the lawyers using the term. Thus, it could be
applied to "rebels" violating the constitutional order of a single country;
persons within the allegiance of one monarch acting against that monarch
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under the purported authority of another monarch; foreign privateers whose
property rights were being denied; or even the officials of a political society
denied legal status as a person subject to the "international legal order," as
defined by each ruler in Christendom for himself, with the legal effect that
the officials of that "non-state" would be regarded in the denying state as
lacking the legal power to change property rights or carry on a legal "war" or
prescribe law in any territory. In its most expansive meanings, no implication
of criminality existed; it was not a crime by any law to be an official of an
unrecognized political society. On the other hand, an individual acting
against the criminal law, or the law regarding "treason" or "mutiny," of a
state could not exculpate himself from the operation of that law by claiming a
license to act issued by an unrecognized "government." A link between
individual criminality and the international legal order was thus put in place,
as the existence of political groups outside the legal order, "outlaw" groups,
meant that action taken pursuant to the " outlaw's" authority was, as far as an
official within the legal order was concerned, unauthorized and, if that action
violated a rule of law of the enforcing official, and occurred within his
perception of his jurisdiction to enforce the rule, could be punished regardless
of the link to an "outlaw" organization.
To follow the evolution of this conception further, it is necessary not only
to understand the fundamental difference in the approaches to defining the
legal order taken by "naturalists" and "positivists," but to know that as
governmental control tightened with the rise of a secular legal order in
Europe based on effective control and ambition, the outer limits of national
assertions ofjurisdiction to prescribe rules of property and criminal behavior
were explored. Some of those limits have already been mentioned, as it was
pointed out that legal words that did not reflect reality may have governed
some statesmen's actions, but that legal policy as well as political action lost
persuasiveness and effectiveness as it departed from reality as perceived by
those whose actions were supposed to be influenced by it. As the vice of
"naturalism" is to attribute legal force to the merely moral commands that
the lawyer or statesman would like to be law but which is denied by others, so
the vice of "positivism" is to treat as if real the model built by mere words to
reflect what the lawyer or statesman would like to be real rather than what
actually is. Where "naturalism" imputes consensus where there may be none,
"positivism" can lead to solipsism - an emphasis on the arbitrary aspects of
consent as the basis of the law-making process, and a retreat to "de jure"
dreams of power.
In any case, in addition to its usage in the international legal order, the
word "piracy" in the 16th and early 17th century was acquiring a meaning in
the municipal legal orders of the countries of Europe whose views of law
were to dominate sophisticated thought for the next four hundred years. It is
impossible to understand the evolution of the conceptions of "piracy" in
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international law without first understanding not only some rudiments of the
conception of the international legal order and some legal theory, but also it is
necessary to consider the municipal law usage, particularly in connection
with municipal criminal law and its jurisdiction to apply to the acts of
foreigners abroad, and municipal property law and the need to mesh that law
with foreign property law so that private property crossing national
boundaries remain secure in the possession of the foreign "owner." We now
turn to that.

English Municipal Law and Piracy in the Renaissance
Jurisdiction and Substance; Admiralty and Common Law. It is beyond the
powers of a sole scholar in reasonable time to analyze the municipal laws that
might relate to the conception of "piracy" of all countries, or even all
European countries, or even a few major European countries. It is fortunately
possible to trace the municipal law ofEnglandl30 as it relates to "piracy" from
the time it began to emerge from the obscurity of time and the vagaries of
medieval records, through the great formative days of Sir Edward Coke
(1552-1634) and Sir William Scott (Lord Stowell) (1745-1836) to modern
times. As in the examination of classical sources, it is necessary to begin with a
word of caution. The word "pirate" does not appear with a precise meaning
in English legalliterature until the 16th century, and attempts to trace the law
regarding "piracy" back beyond that time all seem to assume that other legal
words carried the identical meaning.1 31 The assumption may be correct, but it
is not convincingly argued in any known source despite the extraordinary
volume of writing devoted to the history of the English law relating to
"piracy. " Typical of the confusion, and worth mentioning only because of the
eminence and scholarly reputations earned by the people involved, is the
elaborate history of the English and international laws of "piracy" by Chief
Justice Cockburn in Regina v. Keyn132 and the compilations of documents by
Reginald G. Marsden. 133 In the first, Lord Cockburn refers l34 in some detail to
two cases of Common Law indictment for "piracy" in the time of Kings
Edward II and Edward III.135 In fact the word does not seem to appear in any
of his quotations. 136 Marsden, while reproducing several documents that use
the word in the 14th century and even earlier, notes:
As a legal term "piracy" belongs to a later date. The Latin word is common from the
first, but it was not always used in an evil sense. In 1309 wines are stated to have been
captured" more piratico; " in 1353 "piratae et alii inimici nostri" are spoken of. .. , and in 1359
one Robert Blake, who robbed a ship at sea, is called "pirata" ... But in the twelfth
century ships in the service of William II are spoken of as "piratae"-''jam mare munierat
piratis ... ; Anglici vera piratae qui curam maris a rege susceperant •.. ;" and in 1324 Edward II
prepared for war "Admiralos et piratas super mare constituendo" ••• Before the la tter part of
the 14th century robbery at sea seems to have been dealt with in the King's courts as one
and the same crime as robbery on land; and so of murder and assault. The records do not,
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to the present writer, appear to support the view insisted upon by some of the judges in
Reg. v. Keyn ... that piracy has from the first been recognized by the law of England as a
crime distinct from robbery and murder on land.137

On the other hand, Marsden himself used the word "piracy" in headnotes
to various documents in which neither the word nor any clear concept
appears; his indexes use the word to refer to cases that seem to have nothing to
do with the word or any clear concept of "piracy, " and in at least one place in
his table of contents he refers to a document that seems irrelevant in both
word and sense to anything related to "piracy" and for which he does not use
the word in his own headnote. 138 Occasionally he uses the word to translate
Latin documents in which the word "pirata" or its derivatives does not
appear; since his own note quoted above indicates his awareness of how
deceptive that can be, the practice is inexplicable. In these circumstances, and
finding similar doubts and problems to attend reference to other deservedly
reputable works,139 it seems necessary to return once again to primary
sources, so happily collected by Marsden, hoping only that the reprints
purporting to set out original language are more accurate than the
translations. l40
There are at least three analytically distinct problems that must be seen
clearly before it is possible to understand the growth of English law relating
to "piracy" and its relationships to international law. First, there is the
question of jurisdiction: Is there a court in England empowered by English
law to consider the case? Second, there is the question of substance: Is the
particular act complained of a violation of English law? Third, there is the
question of the reach outside of England of the prescriptions of English law
and the enforcement jurisdiction of English courts. Each of these problems
contains within it a whole host of subsidiary questions and the answers to any
one of them change the pattern in ways that effect the whole problem and,
indeed, the perceptions of all three problems. Because the interplay of these
three problems is so complex, and the implications of tracing any particular
pattern oflegal behavior in disregard of the entire picture are so destructive
of coherence, a basically chronological approach will be taken.
In the earliest documents, as noted above, the word "pirate" (the
documents are in Latin, the word "pirata") and its derivatives are not used in
any sense pertinent to this study. Indeed, Marsden's headnotes to documents
of 1216 and 1228 relating to a ship "piratically captured" and "A pirate
hanged" do not reflect either language or concept in the documents
reproduced. In the first 141 King]ohn directs his port bailiffs to find and deliver
to its owners on presentation of proof of ownership a ship and goods alleged to
have been diverted, and to hold for further action those in whose hands the
ship and goods may be found. The case may involve maritime embezzlement
and in any case seems a civil rather than a criminal matter with an
undifferentiated legal power in the King to resolve both civil and criminal
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aspects of it. In the second, the criminal charge for which one Willelmus de
Briggeho was hanged involved consorting with general evil-doers who
robbed a ship off the port of Sandwich ({(... Willelmus de Briggeho suspensus
postea pro consensu malefactorum navis depredate ante Sandwicum ... ))).1 42 Not only is
the word "pirata" or its derivatives not used, but again the facts are so unclear
as to make any conclusions doubtful. All the people involved might well have
been English, the vessel robbed might have been English, the location seems
to have been mentioned for the purpose of identifying the incident, rather
than as significant to establish any court's or nation's jurisdiction, and the
location is so closely linked with a bit of land clearly within the realm of
England that it is impossible to say that any concept of extending that
jurisdiction seaward was involved.
The earliest reference to an international incident in the modern sense
appears in a document of1289. King Edward I by that document established a
Commission to inquire into "certain trespasses [transgressiones]" committed by
Englishmen against some Frenchmen and complained of by the King of
France. The Commissioners were directed to "cause due restitution to be
made of the goods. "143
Apparently private recapture, self-help, was the normal remedy of seamen
despoiled of their property in those rough times, and well into the next
century,l44 but there is mention ofletters of marque in documents of1293 and
1295 indicating at least a Royal attempt to get control over the activities of his
mariners when foreign ships might become involved and protests from
foreign princes could be expected.1 45 In the latter case, the letter ("licentia
marcandi") granted an English petitioner the legal right at the law of England
to take back from Portuguese "sons of perdition" the value of goods seized by
them under license of the King of Portugal, who is alleged to have got a tenth
of the booty. It is noteworthy that the English license is not directed against
the particular people who took the English goods, but against any subjects of
the realm of Portugal. What seems to have been involved was not an attempt
to get control of robbery at sea, but of private legal remedies; to limit the
rights of English victims to the equivalent of restitution for injury done by a
foreigner, and to avoid as far as possible committing the public forces and
resources of the Crown to the petty struggle.
It was about this time that the post of "Admiral" was established in
England as a magnate authorized to oversee the issuance ofletters of marque
and reprisal and their due performance and ultimate cancellation.146
It is not clear what the source of substantive law was that the Admiral was
supposed to apply. The Commissioners of1289, responding to complaints by
the King of France against English seamen, were directed to make the
restitution "in accordance with the law and custom of our realm,"
England.1 47 In 1361, a prior commission148 to try the case in a Common Law
court (the accused having been caught in England with their booty) was
J
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revoked and replaced by a commission authorizing" our Admirals" to try the
case "according to the maritime law. "149 But the "maritime law" is not likely
to have been conceived as a law foreign to England. The great Code of the
Laws of Oleron, compiled in a small island within the feudallands of Eleanor,
Duchess of Guienne, the wife of Henry II and mother of Kings John and
Richard I, had been promulgated by her for Guienne in the Gascon tongue,
promulgated with revisions then in England by Richard and John, re-issued by
Henry III in 1266, and confirmed by Edward III in 1329.150 They were
distinguished from the Common Law of England by the very fact of royal
promulgation as a Code; the power of interpretation was given to the
Admirals as beneficiaries of royal patronage rather than Common Law judges
with their own traditions of independence and the legal power to develop
custom, as distinct from statutory or decree law, in both criminal and civil
matters. Presumably the merchants most directly concerned with the terms of
maritime law preferred this system also, since their interests could more
easily be pressed at the royal court or with a royal administrator, the Admiral,
than with Common Law judges when a change in the law or its interpretation
was sought in the interest of English sea-borne commerce. Thus, when a
commission of 1374 directed the leading administrators of England's
Southeastern coast to hear and determine various criminal matters arising at
. not
sea aIong the coasts, " supra mare per costeras, "fK
0
ent (t he word"·
pIracy " IS
mentioned: The list of offenses included the Common Law and non-legal
words "robberies, depredations, discords and slayings")151 it seems significant
that the law to be applied was "the law and custom of our realm of England
and ... the law of the sea. "152 The implication is not that the law of the sea is
different from the King's law in England, but that it is different from the other
law of England, the Common Law which includes its own custom. The
reference to the "law of the sea" pointedly omits any reference to custom.
The word "pirate" enters the English legal vocabulary via Latin
commissions in the 15th century. The first direct legal use of the word appears
to have been in an order of Henry VI in 1443 directing the restitution to
Englishmen of goods taken from them by "pirates. "153 The context is purely
civil-a question of property rights, not of crimes, and the word seems to be
used in a pejorative, not a technical, sense. Similarly, a Proclamation by
Henry VII in 1490 mentions:
divers and monyfold spoliations and robberies ... uppon the se unto the said subgettis of
the said most high and myghty princes [of England and various foreign places] ... as well
by their enemyes as by other pirattis and robbers, which, as it is said, daily resorte into
divers portes and places of this his realme of England, and ther be suffered to utter and
sell their prises, spoiles, and pillages .. .154

This seems to classify the "pirates" with "enemies" as well as with
"robbers," and classifies what might be lawful spoils with the booty of
wrongful takings. Significantly, the Proclamation does not purport to apply
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the law of England or the "law of the sea" or "maritime law" to the first
takers of the goods. To discharge the King's international obligations to his
fellow princes it takes a strictly territorial approach, commanding that:
[N]o manner of persons ... from henssforth comfort, take no receyve, in any ... places
of this his realme any of the said mysdoers, ne any merchandisez or goo des by them
spoiled or takyn ... uppon payn of forfeiture of the same merchaundises ... or to the
value thereof, for restitution to be made to the parties grevid, and uppon payn of
imprisonment ... at the Kinges wiII.t55

The command is directed at Englishmen and perhaps foreign merchants only
when they are in England; punishment for the "enemies," "pirates" and
"robbers" is not prescribed, but only for the receivers of their goods in
England.
The earliest reference to "pirates" in a context that seems to attach specific
legal results to their activities seems to be a Latin letter of appointment by
Henry VIII in 1511 to John Hopton, who was directed to:
[S]eize and subdue all and singular such spoilers, pirates, exiles, and outlaws [praedones,
pirates, exu/es, et bannitos] wheresoever they shall be seized, to destroy them and to bring
all and singular of them, who are captured, into one of our ports, and to hand over and
deliver them, when so brought in, to our commissioners .. .1 56

Whether or not this instruction was actually intended to apply to foreigners
in foreign vessels, or only to Englishmen and persons of any allegiance in
English vessels, is not clear. Nor is it clear how far from the coasts of England
Hopton was expected to range; he appears to have confined his activities to
areas within easy sail of English ports157 and the more general language of the
letter of appointment may never have been intended to reach farther.
Moreover, the degree to which the commissioners mentioned in the letter had
jurisdiction in derogation of Admiralty courts and Common Law courts,
whether in fact there were Admiralty courts functioning throughout the
period, are questions it is impossible to resolve without what appears
excessive research. 1ss
Admiralty Commissions and Common Law: The Statutes of 1535 and 1536. The
first attempt to organize the administration of justice regarding maritime
English offenses and have it apply in a regular way, through permanent
tribunals instead of through ad hoc tribunals set up under ad hoc commissions of
the King, was not until 1535. 159 The Preamble to that statute says:
Where pirates, thieves, robbers and murders upon the sea, many times escape
unpunished, because the trial of their offences hath heretofore been ordered before the
admiral, or his lieutenant or commissary, after the course of the civil laws, the nature
whereofis, that before any judgment of death can be given against the offenders, either
they must plainly confess their offences, (which they wiII never do without torture or
pains) or else their offences be so plainly and directly proved by witnesses indifferent,
such as saw their offences committed, which cannot be gotten but by chance at a few
times, because such offenders commit their offences upon the sea ...160
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To cure these legal problems, the statute provides that all "felonies,
robberies, murders and manslaughters" should henceforth be tried by special
Commissions using the forms of the Common Law, under which conviction
and execution were easier. The word "pirates" or its derivatives is not used in
the operative part of the text.
Section IV of the statute of 1535 allows for an unlicensed taking at sea not to
be considered criminal if only necessities of the voyage were taken, and a
written promise to pay for them was given and redeemed within four months
if the taking were "this side of the straits ofMarroke" or 12 months if on the
other side (in the Mediterranean). There is no mention of takings across the
Atlantic or on the other side of the Straits of Magellan; but then Drake had
not yet made his circumnavigation. The statute is silent as to the nationality of
the taker or the victim, or the nationality of the vessels. Nor does it deal with
the defense of vessels anywhere. It appears to envisage the arrest in the
normal Common Law fashion of accused malefactors in England; it thus
merely replaces the discretionary Admiralty courts, using Civil Law
procedures, with tribunals (Commissions) to be appointed and to use
Common Law procedures outside both Admiralty and Common Law systems
in England without affecting the normal rules of jurisdiction.
The statute of 1535 was superseded the following year by a nearly identical
statute, 28 Hen. VIII c. 15 (1536).1 61 The Preamble to the statute of 1535
referred to "pirates, thieves, robbers and murders." The Preamble to the
statute of 1536 refers to "traitours pirotes theves robbers murtherers and
confederatours." Presumably, "traitours" and "confederatours" were added
to the list to take account of evolving Common Law thought that wanted to
classify "piracy" as an Admiralty term for breach of feudal relationships,
equivalent to the master-servant bond in days when status seemed more
important legally than contract ties. Under the laws of Ole ron, the master of
a vessel had some of the legal powers of a feudal superior over his crew. 16:
Thus, "traitours" and "confederatours" (i.e., conspirators, those who join
together to commit a wrongful act) would relate to passengers and crew
within the vessel, and seem to refer to what today would be called
"mutineers. "163 Like the statute of 1535 the statute of 1536 drops the word
"pirate" ["pirotes"] in its substantive terms:
All treasons felonyes robberies murders and confederacies, hereafter to be comytted in
or uppon the see, or in any other haven ryve creke or place where the admyrall or
admyralls have or pretende to have power auctorities or jurisdiction, shall be enquired
harde determyned and judged in such shires and places in the realme as shall be lymytted
by the Kynges Comission or Comissions to be directed for the same, in like fourme and
condicioun as if any such offence or offences hadd been comytted or done in or uppon the
lande; and such comissions shall be ... directed to the admyrall [or his delegates] ... and
to iij or iiij such other substantiall persons as shall be named or appointed by the lorde
chauncellor of Englande ...164
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The legal words of art did not include any reference to international law or
Roman law or, indeed, any concept of "piracy" except in the nontechnical
recitation of the preamble; instead the words of art of the English Common
Law of crimes were used. It is in that context that the word "felonyes" makes
sense; the distinction being drawn involved the technical English law of "high
treason," "petit treason" and Common Law crime, as yet incompletely
distinguished from tresspass, or tort actions. 165
The extraterritorial reach of this legislation was no more clear than before. It
was apparently restricted to the places in which the Admiral by the law of
England had legal power, authority or jurisdiction. That apparently included
vessels flying the English flag wherever they might be afloat, including foreign
ports and the navigable waters ofEngland. l66 But it was never clear whether it
extended to foreign vessels on the high seas or on internal navigable waters of
England which were within the Conunon Law courts' jurisdiction. The case of
Regina v. Keyn showed at great length that there was considerable doubt,
ultimately resolved rightly or wrongly against the Admiral's pretentions, ifhe
had any, that it extended to foreign vessels outside England's Conunon Law
jurisdiction even within three miles of the English coast.
The system remained fundamentally unaltered through the entire period of
this study.167
In Rem Property Adjudications. The earliest technical legal usage of the word
"pirate" in an English court reflects the Roman law origins of the "Civil
Law" applied in those English courts not governed by the "Conunon Law" of
England. l68 In 1553 John Clerke, "Proctor General" of the Admiralty court of
England, referred to goods "left and deposited by Henry Strangwis, Peter
Killigrew, Thomas Killigrew and Baptist Roane & others ... pirates, robbers
and malefactors [piratas predones et malefactores] ... now being under arrest. "169
Apparently it was the goods that were arrested, not the "piratas predones et
malefactores," who had fled. The goods were confiscated and the various
claimants were given a chance before the Admiralty court in an in rem
proceeding to prove their property rights. It is unclear whether the denial of
property rights to those who had fled (presumably for fear of criminal
prosecution in the Conunon Law courts or before Admiralty Conunissions
under the statute of Henry VIII) was a reflection of a legal conclusion that
"pirates" could not possess property at English Conunon or Civil Law. It
might equally well have been a mere incident of the Civil Law system of in rem
proceedings under which those with claims to property must submit those
claims for adjudication in the light of the claims of others, and failure to
present a claim for whatever reason resulted in loss of the possible rights and
carried no criminal law or other general implications.
The notion that calling the possessor of a ship a "pirate" would deprive him
of legal rights to the ship seemed very useful to Sir Julius Caesar,170 who
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applied the word to possible claimants in a series of widely different in rem
cases. For example, in 1585 the Diana was arrested at the order of Caesar and
condemned as a "pirate" ship to be sold for the benefit of the Admiral when
her Master, a Frenchman named Killie, sailing under a French flag, did not
appear. Killie was considered a "pirate" by Caesar even though it seems
possible that he had a French commission, or letters of marque and reprisal,
authorizing in the name of France his depredations against English ships.l7l
There was no criminal action involved.
In another case in 1598, Caesar gave title to a prior owner against a
purchaser who derived his claim to title from an Englishman "commonly,
openly, publicly, and notoriously reputed to be a pirate [articulatis pro pirata
communiter, polam, pubiice, et notorie reputatum fuisse et esse]" in the complete
absence of criminal proceedings or other evidence as to the place of the taking
or the circumstances surrounding it. l72
In 1608 another Admiralty judge, Thomas Crompton, used the word in a
similar way to deny title to James and John Powntis, purchasers "in foreign
parts" of Venetian goods "captured ... by one John Ward,173 and other
pirates and sea rovers" and sold to them apparently via official channels in
Algiers. The goods or their value were granted to the Venetian Ambassador
for the merchants he represented. 174 This case seems to avoid the problem of a
commission for Ward, or the possibility that his capture was a "lawful prize"
or a confiscation for non-payment of Algerine transit tolls, by simply calling
Ward a "pirate" and ignoring the probable subsequent involvement of the
Algerine officials in a legal transaction to transfer title. There was no
criminal proceeding or attempt at definition.
While not pertinent to the definition of the word "piracy," it might be
mentioned in this place that the use of that word to bring into play the idea
that stolen goods should be returned to their previous owner because thieves
by ancient principle cannot pass title they do not have, even to innocent
purchasers, created special problems with regard to the use of the word.
Without denying the superior title of the prior owner to the title a thief might
assert merely by his possession of the goods, the needs of commerce required
greater stability of title when dealing with a foreign seaman; a merchant had
to be able to buy goods from one who might later turn out to have been a
"pirate" (however defined), or a major legal impediment would limit
international seaborne commerce. The solution to this problem appears to
have been not only the easy acknowledgment of title transfers under Barbary
states law for the benefit of corsairs (or "pirates"), but also the application in
English law of the rule that:
[I]f a Man commit Piracy upon the Subjects of another Prince or Republique (though in
League with us) and brings the Goods into England, and sells them in a Market Overt; the
same shall bind, and the Owners are for ever concluded, and if they should go about in
the Admiralty to question the property, in order to restitution [sic], they will be
prohibited. 175
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Englishmen's goods found in England were still to be returned to their English
prior owner as a matter of statute law. 176
A strange incident in 1615 demonstrates the vernacular use of the word by
the highest officials of England to refer to an Admiralty in rem case in which
the word "piracy" was not in fact used but the legal results were drawn
without it. In 1615, Captain Newporte of the Centaur invited the Captain of
the French ship L 'Esperance to dinner off Cape Verde. Newporte then seized
the French ship, whose owner turned out to be the politically influential
Governor of Dieppe, Francois de Villiers Houdan. The English Admiralty
court under Judge Daniel Dun decreed restitution of the vessel or its value to
the French owner, ending a diplomatic crisis. There is no evidence of Captain
Newporte's authority, if any, for his action, nor is there any known record of
a criminal proceeding growing out of the incident. But in the Privy Council
Register for 11 July 1617 there is a reference to money held "for satisfaction of
a sentence given in the Court of Admyraltie on the behalfe of Viliers
Howden, a governor ofDeipe, concerning a pyracie committed upon a shipp
of his by one capten Newporte. "177 Apparently, the word "pyracie" was used
in a non-legal sense to mean something like "unauthorized taking," with an
implication of crime; no clear legal sense seems to have been intended. The
only legal action mentioned was the one for restitution. The word" sentence"
does not seem to refer to any criminal court's action, but to the judgment of
the Admiralty court in an in rem proceeding. It is in this context that it is
possible to interpret the remark of King James I in 1624178 referring to the East
India Company as "pirates" merely for failing to pay him what he felt was his
share of their lawful captures.
Outlawry, Crime and Licenses. From the mid 16th to the mid 17th centuries the
word "pirate" and its derivatives was used more and more frequently in
official English documents not related to property-rights cases before the
Admiralty courts, and had acquired a meaning as a vague basis for everexpanding English assertions ofjurisdiction. In 1569 Queen Elizabeth had by
proclamation denounced "all pyrats and rovers upon the seas" and declared
them "to be out of her protection, and lawfully to be by any person taken,
punished, and suppressed with extremity. "179 Until 1569 ships suspected of
involvement in "piracy" and privateering without a commission had been
treated with strict attention to English forms; they (the ships) were to be
arrested only after arriving at English ports, and Vice-Admirals were simply
warned against harboring or countenancing "pirates" within their jurisdiction as that jurisdiction was established by their commissions. 180 An indication
of the difficulties of an increasingly centralized administration gaining legal
control of English seamen continuing the ancient practice of re-capture
without a license, abusing their opportunities and making general commerce
of English as well as foreign merchants unsafe, lies in the recitation of fact
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accompanying a Warrant from Queen Elizabeth to the Warden of the Cinque
Ports (the English fortified towns strategically situated on the South coast) in
1577:
Whereas there is an unyversall complainte made as well by our owne merchaunts and
fishermen, as also by other merchaunts straungers, being the subjects of our frinds and
allyes, of the great number of pyrats and sea rovers haunting and keeping the narrow
seas and streames thereof ... ; We having care that our streames should be quyet and
voyde of such malefactors, and understanding that sute hath ben made to our previe
Counsell on the behalf of divers townes corporat of our realme, being annoyed by such
pyrates and sea rovers haunting their coasts, to have license to sett fourth shippes for the
chastening and repressing of the said malefactors, offering to do the same at their owne
adventure, proper costs and chardges ... by these presents do geve full power and
authoritie unto you, to give and graunte commissions under the seal ofyour office of the
Cinque Portes to as many, as well cities and townes corporat of this our realme, as you
shall thinke good, as also to others whom you shall thinke such as will not abuse the same,
to arme and sett fourth ... to purge and clere the sea coasts of such evill persons ... 181

Despite the language of outlawry in the Proclamation of 1569, the Warrant of
1577 requires that the forms of English law be followed if any property were
to change hands as a result of the law-enforcement effort. Persons licensed by
the Warden of the Cinque Ports under this Warrant, if they wanted any
compensation for their own costs to be paid out of "the proper shippes and
goo des of the pyrats or sea rovers" they have caught, could do so only "after
they have been thereof attaynted in the [form] of lawe as shall be thought
convenyent by the [officials] of our Exchequier."l82 The procedure was set
out in a series of commissions:
Imprimis that the pyrats taken maye be brought to the next port, and there presented to
the Vice Admirall, ... or the next justice of the peace, who shall send them to the nexte
gaol, their [sic: ther (there)?] to remayne untill they be tryed by order of justice.
That the shippes and goods and merchandizes in the possession of the pyrats be ... valued
by the oth of fower honest, skilfull, and expert persons ... and then delyvered to the
custodie of the said customer ... , their to remayne unto such tyme yt maybe appear how
much thereof shall appertaine to these pyrats, and how much to others. l83

"customer " apparentIy meant " customs enrorcer,
r " I.e.,
.
person hid·
0 mg a
license to patrol the coast and see to the enforcement of English import laws.
The word "pyrat" seems to have been applied to smugglers as well as those
whose acts fell within the legal terms used in the legislation of Henry VIII
quoted above.
The term "pirate" was used also to cover Englishmen holding foreign
commissions as "privateers" without the Queen's permission. In a Proclamation of 1575 the situation is clearly described:
[H]er Majestie's will and pleasure is that none of her subjects shouldentermeddle in anie
quarrells of anie forraigne prince or subjects, either on thone side or thother, (speciallie
by sea), without her Majestie's license ... Because now oflate, under pretence of those
forraigne services, manie piracies be dailie committed and done, yea in her Majestie's
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owne ports, and a great number of maryners ... be torned from good subjects to be
pirates ... And because her Heighnes hathe further bin informed that divers of her
officers . . . have wincked often at theis disorders . . . express warning to all her
Heighnes' officers that whosoever shall be hereafter founde to be negligent in the
apprehending of suche malefactors in the execution of this proclamation, or shall
wincke at their doinges, ... shall not onlie lose their offices, but shall incurr her
Majestie's further displeasure., and be suerlie punished .. .184

This Proclamation apparently rested on the assumption that "piracy" was not
illegal at international law but only at English municipal law, and that the
English jurisdiction was felt to be grounded in the relationship between
subject and sovereign, not in any jurisdiction over the acts of foreigners. Some
territorial aspect to jurisdiction seems to be iniplied by the failure to
distinguish between acts done in "her Maj estie's owne ports" as well as in the
narrow seas (which were, in any case, regarded as within English prescriptive
jurisdiction even if only to exclude foreign ships or make them as a legal unit
obey English law without actually applying English law within them) and in
the Warrant issued at about the same time to the Warden of the Cinque Ports
mentioning "oure streames." "Piracy" seems to have meant robbery or some
other crime listed in the legislation of Henry VIII within the jurisdiction
given then to Admiralty Commissions, and not acts done by foreigners
outside of that jurisdiction. As noted above, that jurisdiction was territorial
and extended to English flag vessels, but, despite the learned arguments of the
minority in Regina v. Keyn, did not at this time in practice extend to foreign
flag vessels on the high seas or foreigners within foreign vessels in English
seas.
The notion that persons holding a foreign license might be enemies but not
criminals even if acting on board English vessels or against English vessels,
even if acting in English rivers and portions of the seas, may be seen in the
restriction to English subjects of the terms of the Proclamation of 1575. In
approving the draft Warrant of1577 Lord Burghley, the head of Elizabeth's
administrative office, indicated that this was his conception. He wrote to the
Warden of the Cinque Ports, Lord Cobham, that if there were peace between
England and Spain the entire fuss would subside "for lack of victims. "185
Further evidence that the word "pirate" was applied in 1577 without specific
meaning at international law exists in a note by David Lewes, an Admiralty
judge apparently consulted by Lord Burghley in this matter. At the bottom of
a draft letter of assistance to Sir William Morgan ordering her Majesty's
officials to help him prepare for his voyage of discovery and "also (if occasion
so serve) to serve against the Turkes and Infydells, " Lewes wrote "Instede of
this make a permission to take pyrates, according to her Majestie's
warrant. "186 It is hard to see how "Turkes and Infydells" were necessarily
criminals at English law or how English law extended to places in which the
discovery of unknown lands might be made. And there is no evidence at all
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that "Turkes and Infydells" were conceived at that time as necessarily
violators of international law in Europe. Indeed, it would seem that Lewes's
note was not a legal translation of Morgan's request, but a denial of that
request as it might apply to "Turkes and Infydells," restricting Morgan's
authority to whatever authority was given to commissioners under the
warrant of 1577.
The needs of English commerce and possibly imperial policy seem to have
influenced Lewes, and two years later, in 1579, he issued a legal opinion in
which the earlier documents other than the Proclamation of 1569 were
ignored and the most expansive statement of English jurisdiction was given to
the Lord High Admiral:
First it is lawful for every man, by the lawes of the sea, to apprehend and take pyrats,
being public enemies to all estates, without authority 0; commission.
Secondly, the Queen's Majesty for proclamation published in Aprill ano 11° regni sui
[1569], hath declared and denounced all pyrats and rovers upon the seas to be out of her
protection, and lawfully to be by any person taken, punished, and suppressed with
extremity.
Thirdly, the first and principall part of the Lord Admirall's office by law is, and ever
hath been, to clear the jurisdiction apperteyning to his office, being the sea, of pyrats and
rovers haunting the same; in respect whereofhe hath, and ever hath had their goods and
chattels, being condemned and atteynted for the same.
Fourthly, by his Lordship's letters patents it may appeare that he hath a more ample and
larger power than to set forth ships to take pyrats.1 87

The implementation of this opinion, which seems to have no legal argument
in it to support its conclusions oflaw, indicates that it was not taken seriously
as a statement of international law by the Crown. Shortly after it was issued,
Elizabeth complained to Lewes as an Admiralty judge, Sir Gilbert Gerrard as
A ttorney General, and 13 others involved in the enforcement of the law, that
the 1577 warrant had not worked well. Instead of simply instructing the
Admiral to suppress "piracy" by seizing "pirates" wherever he found them
under the general law of the sea or as outlaws under English law as Lewes's
opinion seems to have urged, she stiffened the enforcement in England of the
English procedures by providing for small Commissions consistently with the
statute of Henry VIII:
To enquire searche and trie out ... by oathes of twelve good men or otherwise by all
waies and meanes you can devise of all manner of person or persons that have offended
... contrarie to the lawes and statutes of this our realme or equitie and justice ...188

The possibility that" equitie and justice" was intended to include international law seems to have been overborne by the need to dispose of the
property of the "pirates," however defined, under the forms of English law.
Those forms were essential to the prosperity of the Admiral however
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inconsistent with the view Lewes might have had as to the legal justifications
at international law for individuals unlicensed by the Crown to seize
"pirates." When a fearless adventurer like Sir Walter Ralegh was involved,
there was no thought of his simply seizing "pirate" goods any place. His
appointment in 1585 to be "Vice Admiral" was restricted to "the countie of
Cornwall and the sea quoasts thereunto adjoyning," and he was required to
post bond against the possibility that he might fail to make true account" of all
suche piratts' goods, concelmentes, profitts, and casualties, as shall happen to
growe and rise within the precincte of the said Viceadmirallshippe." Fully
half of the "pirate" goods coming to him in his new post was to go to his
political senior, the Lord Admiral.I89 And in 1589 an Order in Council was
issued that all English captures, with no exceptions, must be submitted to an
Admiralty court to have the lawfulness of the prize adjudged; failure to abide
by the procedure meant that the buyers got no title and the commission under
which the prize was taken was to be considered void. 190

Coke'sSl'nthesis. There are many documents relating then to the growth of
the English law regarding prize and commissions, letters of marque and
reprisal under the centralized administration Lord Burghley organized for
Queen Elizabeth. In them there is no indication that "pirates" might be taken
without a commission,l91 and by 1599 there is some indication that the word
"pirate" was acquiring yet another meaning in English, as a generic term
carrying with it the implication of criminality and applied to English captains
who ignored the rules under which the Admiral made his living:
[H]er Majestie now commaundeth, that whosoever shall herafter intermeddle with, or
take at sea, any shippe or vessell coming from, or going to, any port or haven belonging
to the sayd Seigneurie of Venice, or Grand Duke ofTuskane, and shall break the bulke of
the goodes of any such shipp or vessell, (though the prise be lawfull), before the same
shalbe adjudged good prize in the high court of the Admiralty, such offendors shalbe
executed as pirates, and the shippe, with the prize also, shalbe forfeited to her
Majestie. l92

The relationship between the English municipal law regarding "piracy"
and the international law of "piracy," if there was any before 1600, received
attention at the most prestigious levels of English municipal law in 1615 when
Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of England at the Common Law criminal
court of King's Bench, presided over two cases in which "piracy" was an
issue. The reports of these cases by Rolle are important to an understanding of
the English conception of "piracy" as the word entered common legal usage
and England became the world's greatest sea power.
Marche's Case, alias Palachie's Case,193 concerned a capture of a Spanish
ship by a Moroccan official during a time when England regarded Morocco
and Spain as legally at war.194 Acknowledged as a subject of the King of
Morocco, Palachie represented to the court that:
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He is the Moroccan Ambassador to the Netherlands and that on the sea he captured a
Spanish ship (there being war between the King of Barbary [sic] & the King of Spain) and
then coming with the ship in England, & thereupon the Spanish Ambassador complained
against him as a Pirate, & diverse Civil Law experts were commanded by the King [of
England] to give their opinions on the matter. They agree that an Ambassador is immune
from local law by the law of nature & of Nat ions, but if he commits any offense against
the law of nature or of reason, he loses his immunity; not so ifhe offends only a positive
law of any particular country, such as laws regarding clothing, etc. And many other
questions were answered by the civilians; but as we [the panel]195 and other common law
Justices are asked for our opinions, we should say that the civilians have missed the point,
because the Defendant is being tried here for piracy, and being tried under the statute of
28 Henry VIII cap. [15? The text has a blank space here], which says that piracy should
be tried as a felony committed on land under the common law. And what is charged as
piracy here is not piracy nor would it be even a felony had it been committed on land [the
report repeats some words here and seems slightly garbled] because it is legal for one
enemy to capture another on land. According to our opinion and the relevant statute
[which is cited] we hereby rule accordingly, that if anybody wants to bring charges
against another under the pertinent statute [ citing another] he who is robbed must prove
that he himself was a legal friend of our Lord the King, and that he who robbed him was
within the jurisdiction of our Lord the King or in legal friendship, because if the taking
was by an enemy it was not robbery but lawful capture. As to Palachie's Case, we agree
with the civilians that the [Spanish] Ambassador could proceed against him civilly for
the goods that are here, for those are in friendly territory, (R[olle]: I question whether it
seems that by the law of nations an enemy can legally take from another [in neutral
territory?]}Dod. suggests that rights of reprisal might be significant; Coke suggests that
if goods were taken illegally and not restored, the King [of England] might simply
return them.l 96 Coke and Dod. also said that nobody could be hanged for piracy based on
robbery on the Thames [River] because that is within an English county [thus outside the
Admiral's jurisdication?].I97

In the second case, Hildebrand, Brimston, & Baker's Case,198 English
shipowners were trying to recover their ship in an in Tem proceeding at
Admiralty. The ship and cargo had been captured by "pirates." The
petitioners sought the intervention of the King's Bench Common Law court
to prohibit further Admiralty proceedings, apparently fearing the Admiral's
interest in "pirate" goods would make it difficult for them to recover what
they felt was theirs.
Those men [petitioners] were the owners of a ship, and sent it to the Indies to trade. On
the high sea the sailors took the ship through "Piracy" (as is assumed in the Admiralty
court) and as the ship returned here to the Thames the Admiral seized it and all that is on
it as "pirate goods," claiming it all for himself under the terms of his Royal warrant, and
the merchants are taking the sails and tackling out of the ship and are suing for them in
the Admiralty court. The Petitioners now pray for a "Prohibition" to that court, to stop
the action. Coke agrees that the Admiralty has, by the grant of the King, all "Pirate
goods;" i.e., the property of pirates. But the Admiralty does not have the goods which
pirates took from other men, because that is not witltin the Royal grant; the owners have
those things. And if the Admiralty wants those goods, it may not sue for them in prize
because they are within the body of a county of England, that is, on the Thames. Dod.: If
a man borrows a horse, and commits a robbery while riding it, the horse is not forfeit; so
here, the ship is not forfeit simply because those who were in the ship committed piracy.
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Coke agreed, and he asked the Petitioners if they were convicted of piracy; to which
they replied that nobody had been convicted. So the Prohibition was granted on the
ground that the taking had been within the body of a county of England.199

It seems plain from both these cases that Coke was primarily concerned with
the division ofjurisdiction in England between the Admiralty courts and the
Common Law courts; that to him "piracy" was simply the Admiralty word
for an offense against the law of England that was based on the "Civil Law,"
i.e., the Roman law based system that English courts with extra-territorial
reach applied to transactions occurring outside England, and not the
Common Law; that it carried legal results at the Civil Law which were not
the same as the legal results the same action would have drawn at Common
Law.
In summarizing the legal situation long after these cases were decided,
Coke addressed "Piracies, Felonies, Murders and Confederacies committed
in or upon the Sea" by first noting that James I's amnesty for felons given on
his coronation in 1602 did not extend to pirates because theirs was not an
offense at Common Law, but at Civil Law, outside the kingdom, without the
legal result of forfeiture ofland or corruption of "bloud" (i.e., disinheriting
the children).2oo His entire discussion of the substance of the offense is based
on the technical construction of statutory English law except for a major
assertion that only subjects of England could legally be tried for "piracy." To
Coke "piracy" at Common Law was a type of "petit treason," and those who
are not subject to the King ofEngland cannot break the tie of allegiance, since
there is no such tie, therefore they cannot commit treason, therefore, with
only minor exceptions, there cannot be a foreigner guilty of "piracy. "201 Since
resident foreigners, denizens of the realm, do come within the allegiance of
the King for some purposes, it might appear that Coke's language is
somewhat too general and his conclusion too broad, but since "piracy"
cannot occur within the realm, where the Common Law applies to the
exclusion of Civil Law, that exception would not apply and Coke's analysis
seems beyond dispute. The effect of Coke's approach, which seems to set out
the traditional English position as reached by a judge concerned with
questions of jurisdiction and limiting the Crown's discretion, is simply to
make "piracy" the legal word of art that Admiralty tribunals and
commissions set up under the Act of 1536 applied to some but not all of the
"crimes" listed in that Act. As a kind of "petty treason," it would seem that
all cases of "mutiny" in an English vessel, i.e., a vessel with a master whose
authority over the ship's company and passengers is fixed by English law,
could be denominated "piracy." Also, an attack by one English vessel on
another could be denominated "piracy" since both vessels would have been
conceived to have a legal existence deriving from a common superior, the
Admiral or the Crown, and an attack by one on the other would necessarily
involve a breach of legal subordination by the attacking vessel unless
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otherwise authorized by the Admiral or Crown. But, if the law regarding
"piracy" were part of the criminal law of England and derived from the
feudal conception of treason, it could apply only to those within the
allegiance of the Crown in England, just as King John ' s Norman knights could
not commit "treason" by attacking John's English subjects, whatever else
their acts may have meant legally. Under this "treason," personal allegiance,
conception, the English Admiral's jurisdiction, and thus the jurisdiction of
Commissions set up under the Act of 1536, would apply only to English
vessels, not to foreign vessels, in navigable waters (of course, all vessels infra
corpus comitatus would be subject to the Common Law courts of the Shire, not
the Admiralty at all). To Coke and the Common Law judges ofEngland in the
early 17th century, Admiralty jurisdiction itself must then have seemed in a
sense territorial, with English ships filling the role of counties in England, and
foreign vessels being ruled by the municipal laws of whatever countries gave
their captains authority to command the ships' companies and passengers.
One major gap must have disturbed Coke, although no mention of it
appears in his known writings. What law governs the actions of a foreign
vessel attacking an English ship, or an English vessel without license attacking
a foreign ship? In both those cases, the breach of allegiance apparently
necessary before the label "piracy" could attach, would be present only in the
case of an Englishman aboard the foreign attacker or the fortuitous presence
of an Englishman aboard the foreign vessel attacked. In the first case, it would
seem that the assault on an English vessel would likely have been analogized
to a similar assault in an English county's territory; the foreign attacker
would have been guilty of an assault or robbery within the jurisdiction of the
Admiralty under the Act of1536, thus triable by a Commission; but the crime
would not have been "universal" or "law of nations" "piracy," it would have
been "assault" or "robbery" or some Admiralty term, perhaps "piracy,"
equivalent to that. In the second case, there would have been no crime in
England unless the breach of the terms of a commission or letters of mark and
reprisal justifying the forfeiture of a deposit or other civil penalty. The gap in
English law and jurisdiction here seems to have been the basis for the
difficulties Queen Elizabeth's administration tried to solve by the Warrant of
1577, and the path by which the vernacular word "piracy" began to enter the
legal vocabulary applied to Englishmen injuring foreigners abroad.
It should be noted that foreigners aboard English vessels were, by Coke's
notion, "denizens" within the allegiance of the King of England, thus there
was a territorial basis in the nationality of a vessel for attaching English
jurisdiction to some foreigners. Coke's conception of the "high seas" (or
navigable waters) did not apparently make them part of any "territorial" part
of England or trace the Admiral's jurisdiction to any concept of territoriality
other than the analogy between a vessel itself and a bit ofEnglish territory for
the purposes of jurisdiction, and the notion that Common Law courts'
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jurisdiction stopped at the edge of navigable waters. The Admiral did not rule
the seas, only English vessels on the seas and perhaps Englishmen in foreign
vessels for some limited purposes where they, as the "denizens" of a foreign
sovereign, had to satisfy two allegiances and could be the victims of English
"pirates" in the traditional sense as persons against whom a "petty treason"
at English law could be committed.
From this point of view, the later notion that to be "piracy" there had to be
an exchange between two vessels of different legal subordination was a
complete reversal of the "petty treason" definition in English Common Law
as applied in Admiralty. Also, from this point of view, the notion was
excluded that England ruled the British seas as a matter of territorial right as
Grotius might have argued. The Grotian view of mare clausum might have had
considerable appeal to statesmen, but required a reconsideration of the
fundamentally feudal English conceptions of jurisdiction. It was, of course,
out of these inconsistencies that the confusions of Regina v. Keyn grew, as the
English assertions of territorial rights in the "Narrow Seas" (the English
Channel), the North Sea and elsewhere, or even in the three-mile strip of
navigable waters surrounding the British Isles, were not matched by
legislation placing those "territories" within the body of a county or within
the "territorial" jurisdiction of the Admiral as the law-giver for English
ships.

Summary. Based on Queen Elizabeth's Warrants of 1569 and 1577, and the
conceptions of territoriality that seem to underlie them, and the summary by
Coke in the reign of James I some fifty years later emphasizing a breach of
feudal personal ties as the root of the conception of the substantive crime of
"piracy," it seems clear that later English assertions of jurisdiction over
foreign "pirates" for their acts against other foreigners, or even against
English vessels abroad, did not grow from any "natural law" concept of
universal jurisdiction over thieves, or the universality of property rights. The
assertions grew from the impact on English vessels or English persons of foreign
depredations, the impact on an English ship being analogized to an impact
amounting to physical presence in an English county, and the Admiral's
jurisdiction being that of a county judge with regard to events within English
traditional jurisdiction but outside the physical bounds of an English county. It
seems that this conception is also what gave rise in later years to the notion, first
expressed by Sir Leoline Jenkins in 1680,202 that to be "piracy" two ships had to
be involved; one of them being a ship flying the flag of the country whose
"Admiral" was seeking a jurisdictional basis to hear the case. There is
apparently no basis in the early English law for "universal" jurisdiction over
foreigners abroad in connection with acts denominated "piracy."
One other case before the King's Bench at about this time appears to have
ended the question of the legal status of the Barbary states as far as concerns
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English Common Law. In 1617 an Englishman named Howe was alleged to
have sent his servant, Saddocke, with a known counterfeit jewel to
"Barbary," where the jewel was sold for 800 pounds English money to the
"Roy de Barbary." The King of Barbary, after discovering the fraud,
imprisioned Southerne, another Englishman there, until Southerne repaid the
value of the fraud. The transaction appears to be similar in sense to holding a
foreign merchant through a capture under letters of marque and reprisal,
responsible for the value of goods wrongfully taken by his countryman,
except that there appears to have been no attempt first to exhaust the English
remedies, perhaps because the "King of Barbary" did not choose to submit
himself to English remedies as a matter of royal pride. Southerne then sued
Howe for the amount of his ransom. Lord Popham threw the case out saying
that there should be no legal indemnification to the plaintiff on the basis of his
imprisonment without conviction in Barbary because that was merely an act
of a "barbarous King," for which he should seek remedy through a petition to
the Crown, not through the courts. 203 Whatever else might be doubtful in the
conclusion or reasoning of the case, the dictum that the "barbarous King"
was nonetheless a King for being barbarous, implying that the Barbary states
were states for purposes of English municipal law , and their rulers entitled to
the dignity of foreign sovereigns, was clear. The case was frequently cited
afterwards for that proposition, despite the fact that the same result would
have flowed had the King been merely a pirate chief (why should Howe have
been responsible for the lawless acts of an outlaw any more than for the
lawful, or legally unchallengeable, acts of a King?).204
From this brief survey, it would seem that there were several different
conceptions of "piracy" reflected in the English municipal law of the late
16th and early 17th centuries and within those conceptions, several major
issues of definition. One conception, expressed most persuasively by Lord
Coke, was that "piracy" was not at all part of the Common Law of England,
but was part of the "Civil Law" enforced in England in appropriate cases. To
Coke, those cases were only those to which English concepts ofjurisdiction
gave purview to English officials responsible for enforcing the Civil Law.
With regard to "piracy," he used the word to refer to a host of Civil Law
offenses within the jurisdiction of the English Admiral by tradition and Royal
delegation. That jurisdiction gave the Admiralty courts purview over
offenses that would be Common Law offenses had they been committed with
the "corpus comitatus," the body of an English county, and included any
forcible takings, whether properly considered "robbery," "murder" or,
apparently, any other violation of the King's peace. The people subj ect to that
jurisdiction were those within the King's "ligeance," including English
subjects wherever they might be, and foreigners acting within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Admiral, i.e., in English ships. It did not apply to foreigners
who acted under commissions of their own sovereigns, regardless of where
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and who their victims. Nor did it apply to foreigners without commissions
acting beyond the "territorial" reach of English jurisdiction (including ships
administered under English law). To Coke, the jurisdictional rules and ties of
allegiance were the essence of the matter; the law defining the substance of
the offense could be changed by statute.
To David Lewes and presumably other Admiralty judges and officials, the
word "piracy" carried much wider connotations. There appeared to them to
be a wider general law forbidding "piracy" under which the Admiral and his
delegates could act, if not indeed any person with or without commission. But
what the precise definition of "piracy" was, whether it included all "Turkes
& Infydells" regardless of their political organization or specific activities,
and what happened to "pirate" goods once captured, were questions they
seem to have left unanswered. Their conception seems to have derived from
the use of the term "piracy" in vernacular English, taking what seemed
politically useful, and ignoring those parts of the common usage, like
reference to "lawful prize," that seemed to get in the way. The highest
officials of England seem from time to time to have adopted this common
usage, but despite Lewes's position on the Admiralty court and as a
Commissioner under the statute of28 Henry VIII, his general notions appear
never to have been translated into legal documents or English legal practice.
To Sir Julius Caesar and other Admiralty judges, the concept of "piracy"
was important as part of the Civil Law of property applied through in rem
proceedings by English Admiralty courts. There seemed to be a tendency to
use the word in connection with property seized within Admiralty jurisdiction without the authority of a commission or letters of marque and reprisal.
But the legal result of that usage was connected with the disposition of the
property, not the person who seized it. The usage did not reflect a concept of
criminal law, but of property law; the 16th and 17th century English Civil
Law version of the ancient Roman law of postliminium.
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34. U., p. 175.
35. This Roman hegemony was achieved not by mere assertion or, indeed, by simple conquest, but in the
main by diplomacy and by treaty. See Livy, Rome and the MeJiterranean (H. Bettenson, trans!.) (Penguin
Classics 1976), passim, for a lively English translation of the principal part of books 31-35 ofLivy's History.
The Roman hegemonial system involved military alliances in return for which Rome guaranteed the
personal position of the person invested as the embodiment of the legal power of the client state. A very
clear and evocative description is Sallust, TheJugurthine War O.C. Rolfe, trans!.) (LCL 1931, 1960) 14. A
lively modern translation is Sailust,Jugurthille War; Conspiracy of Cataline (S.A. Hanford, trans!.) (Penguin
Classics 1963). See esp. the speech of Adherbal to the Roman Senate in 116 B.C. in the Loeb edition 14.1-25
at 14.7, p. 158; Penguin edition ch. IV, p. 47 sq. The British imperial system appears in many ways to have
been patterned on the Roman, with "recognition" under the British interpretation of international law
filling the place ofinvestiture under the donation of the Roman Senate. Since the British interpretation of
international law was not necessarily identical with international law objectively derived, and the
municipal constitutional and inheritance law of the state principally involved actually determined
representational powers, not international law as such, the British practice amounted to the establishment
of British imperial law and the extinguishing of the foreigu state as a person under international law; it led
to many wars when pressed as a matter oflaw beyond British political power since it was essentially a
political, not a legal, maneuver. Examples are dissected in Rubin, Imernational Personality of the Malay
Peninsula (University of Malaya Press 1974) passim, particularly the acquisition of Singapore as analyzed at
p. 167-169,253-277. The process is analyzed in some detail in chapter IV below.
36. Plutarch, op. cit. note 33 above, xxv, p. 177: "egrapse .Ie' Gabinios, heis ton Pompeiou sllllethon, lIomon ou

nauarchian, antikrus .Ie' monarchian autoi JMonta kai Junamin epi pantas anthropous anupeuthunon."
37. Just what these" crimes" were, and against what law other than the Roman hegemony that did not
become law until after the conquest and the evolution of Roman conceptions oflaw under Augustus, is not
clear. Furthermore, it appears that their "unpardonable crimes" consisted of resistance to the Roman
sovereignty, since those who had participated in commerce-raiding but who surrendered seem to have
been freely and humanely treated as conquered enemies. This passage looks like an illogical interpolation
by a post-Augustan Greek scholar guarding his safety under a rigid Roman imperial system more interested
in justifications than in historical accuracy.
38. Plutarch, op. cit. note 33 above, xxvi-xxviii, p. 181-187. It has been suggested that the "pirates"
whom Pompey had settled at Dyme returned to sea roving about 45 B.C. Cicero, contemplating a trip to
Achaia in July 44 B.C.,just four months after Julius Caesar's assassination in the Roman Senate chamber,
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wrote: "It is not surprising that the Dymaeans, having been driven out of their land, are making the sea
unsafe. " 6 Cicero, Letters to Atticus (D.R. Shackleton Bailey, transl. and notes) 151 (1968),letter XVI.1 (409)
para. 3. In the original Latin: "Dymaeos agro pulsos mare infestum habere nil mirum. Id. 150. Shackleton Bailey
suggests that the "pirates" who had been settled there by Pompey in 67 B.C. and the Dymaeans were the
same folk, apparently "dispossessed by Caesar and returned to their old calling." Id. 281. Cicero does not
seem shocked or to have any reference to criminaliry when he refers to them as "pirates" a few days later in
another letter to Atticus: "It looks as though the legions can be dodged more easily and safely than the
pirates, who are said to be in evidence [... devitatio legionumfore videturquam piratum, qui appareredicuntur]. " ld.
164-165, letter XVI.2 (412). The "pirates" and the "legions" seem equally hazards to safe travel. The
"legions" referred to were presumably the forces under the control of Marc Antony seeking to wrest
control of Rome from the Senate after the death of Caesar. It was indeed one of the legionaries under
Antony's command who killed Cicero attempting to escape Italy about a year and a halflater. See text at
note 47 below.
39. Id., xxix at p. 189-191: " ... alia tous te peiratas ekselon etimoresato, kai ton Oktaouion .•. apheken."
40. Those results were essentially to put the losers at the discretion of the victors; the men were
frequently killed and the women enslaved. There were no trials, no accusations or defenses, no lawyers
involved. See Euripides, The Trojan Women (415 B.C.). See below.
41. Livy, History, i. 23. An excellent modem translation of Books I-V of this work is Livy, The Early
History of Rome (A. de Selincourt, transl.) (Penguin Classics 1971). See p. 59-60.
42. Id., p. 60-61. Livy's version may reflect more religious myth than political history. Modem research
in this area began with the reanalysis of Roman and Greek religious and political forms by N.D. Fustel de
Coulanges, La Cite Antique (1864). See Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City (transl. unknown) (Doubleday
Anchor Books 1956), Introductory note at p. 5-6.
43. See below.
44. Livy, op. cit. note 41 above, i, 32, at p. 69-71.
45. Id., p. 381-383.
46. Cf. Cicero, De Officiis, I, xi, 36: "As for war, humane laws touching it are drawn up in the fetial code
of the Roman People under all the guarantees of religion; and from this it may be gathered that no war is
just [lawful?], unless it is entered upon after an official demand for satisfaction has been submitted or
warning has been given and a formal declaration made [Ac belli quidem aequitas anctissime fetiali populi Romani
iure perscripta est. Ex quo intellegi potest nullum bellum esse iustum, nisi quod aut rebus repetitis geratur aut denuntiatum
ante sit et indictum]. " Cicero does not say that Rome never fought a war without going through the religious
rituals, only that such wars should not be considered "lawful." The Latin word "ius" in this context seems
to relate solely to the form of "law," not to ''justice'' or moraliry. The English distinctions between
"justice" and policy-based "law" are in many cases reversed in Latin, or simply disregarded; in this case
Cicero was obviously referring to the ''jus fetiali" adopted as a matter of discretion into Roman positive
law and not reflecting "justice" except indirectly. To Cicero, "true law [vera lex]" was moral and overrode
the positive law in cases of conflict. Cicero, De Re Publica, III, xxii, 33. Grotius, writing in the 17th century
quoted Cicero's linking of the form of declaration with the phrase "bellum iusturn" as an aspect of Roman
law to support the very different notion that to be "lawful" under his concept of the law between states
war must be declared publicly: "Sed ut ius tum hoc significatu bellum sit • .• ut audivimus, ut et publice decretum sit, et
quidem ita decretum publice ut eius rei significatio ab altera partium alteri facta sit•.. Grotius, De lure Belli ac Pacis (1625,
1646) III, iii,S (photographic reproduction 1925). F.\V. Kelsey, translating this passage for the Carnegie
Endowment edition of 1925, correctly translates "iustum" as "lawful." 3 Grotius, On the Law of War and
Peace (CECIL 1925) 633-634. T~is double tra?,~po~!tion a ~oman positive law form i~~o internati~nal
law, and the reversal of meamng between IUS and lex as the correct word for moral law or
"justice" as distinguished from positive law, has created much confusion in later writings. In fact, Grotius
seems to have read Cicero entirely correctly; to Grotius a "declaration of war" was, despite the quoted
passage, clearly not required to bring into play the international law of war. An attack against a state or a
refusal of reparations when legally due were, to Grotius, equivalent to a declaration of war under natural
law, thus reducing the formal declaration to its place in positive municipal law. Id., III, iii, 6.1: "Naturali iure
aut vis illata arcetur, aut ab eo ipso qui deliquit poena deposcitur, nulla requiritur denuntiatio." In fact, public
declarations of war in the days of the Roman empire were exceptional despite the religious ceremonies
given such emphasis by Livy and Cicero. 4 Dio Chrysostom, Discourses (Discourse 38, To the Nicomedians)
(H. Lamar Crosby, transl.) (LCL 1956) 48 at p. 67: " ... while peace is proclaimed by heralds, wars forthe
most part take place unproclaimed [eirene men epikerussetai, polemoi de hos epi to pleiston akeruktoi gignontai]."
Both "epikerussetai" and "akeruktoi" come from kerusso-to proclaim. It seems clear from the context that
Dio Chrysostom, discoursing shortly after his return from exile in 96 A.D. (id. 49; 1 id. (Cahoon introd.)
viii) apparently thought it common knowledge at that time that wars could be begun without formaliry,
but some formaliry was needed to end them. Grotius quoted this passage from Discourse 38 to support his
assertion that the law of nature allows people to dispense with the formaliry of declarations of war at least
in some cases. In fact, the fetial practice had died out long before Livy described it and had become a more
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political than religious ceremony fully a century or two prior to the time ofLivy and Cicero. Ogilvie, A
Commentary on Livy Books 1-5 127-130 (1965).
In addition to overstating the importance of religious ritual to the legal classification "war" or "peace"
in practice, Cicero also seems to have confused to some extent the moral or legal right of a state to fight a
war and the right of an individual to assert soldiers' privileges under the law of that state. He quotes Marcus
Cato the elder for the proposition of Roman law that "the man who is not legally a soldier has no right to be
fighting the foe [negat enim ius esse, qui miles non sit, cum hoste pugnare]" (De Officiis, I, xi, 37), but does not assert
that an enemy is bound by the same rule, thus seems to imply that it is not a rule of natural law or
international law, only a rule of Roman municipal law applied to determine whether a Roman citizen was
exercising a military privilege to kill or not should the question arise.
47. The complex politics of Rome at this period are not important to the present analysis. Cicero had
sided with Pompey the Great against Julius Caesar at times, and with the Senatorial party of Brutus and
Cassius against the triumvirate of Marc Antony, Lepidus and Octavian that seized power on the death of
Julius. See 7 Plutarch, op. cit. note 38 above, 83 sq., esp. p. 206-207 making clear Plutarch's opinion of
Antony's responsibility for Cicero's death, and the reasons for it. See also 3 Cicero, Letters to Atticus cited
note 38 above, 179-181, letter VIII.8 (131), paras 4-5, and letter VIII.2 (152), penultimate paragraph, for
insight into Cicero's relations with Pompey in 50 B.C.
48. See note 19 above.
49. De Officiis, III, 29: " ... Nam pirata non est ex perduellum numero definitus, sed communis hostis omnium: cum

hoc nee fides nee jus jurandum esse commune."
50. Grotius, op. cit. note 46, II, xiii, 15; Kelsey translation volume at p. 373. As Grotius interpreted the
quoted portion of Cicero's work, Cicero argued a non sequitur:
That there is no perjury if the ransom for life, which had been agreed upon even under oath, is not
paid to pirates, for the reason that a pirate is not entitled to the rights of war, but is the common
enemy of mankind, with whom neither good faith nor a common oath should be kept.
Cicero did not in fact mention the "rights" ofwar, and, as Grotius pointed out, there seems no reason why
an oath to God should not be kept with even brigands; it hardly seems logical or moral to construe a
violation of the law to lead to the conclusion that the violator is necessarily no longer protected by law.
Even convicted criminals are in fact legally protected in many ways in many legal systems, including that
of ancient Rome.
51. See below. Nothing has been found in Cicero's writing or Plutarch's or any other Roman sources of
that time that can fairly be read to relegate "pirates" to overall treatment as criminals under Roman or any
other law in classical times.
52. Cicero, De Officiis III, xii-xvi.
53. 7 Plutarch, op. cit. note 33 above,441 at 444 sq. Plutarch's narrative of the famous episode in the life of
the youngJulius Caesar (he was 19 years old at the time) uses a derivative of the Greek work "peirato" in one
place only (i. 8 at p. 444), in placing the capture near the "island Pharmacusa, by pirates [peiraton], who
already at the time controlled the sea [ten Pharmakoussan neson hupo peiraton ede tote • .• katechonton ten
thalattan]." Later, these "pirates" are referred to as Cilicians [Kilissi] (ii, 2, p. 444). They thus appear to be
the specific people also involved in the Pompeian war of 67 B.C. No other passage has been found in which
the word "peirato" or any of its derivatives was applied at this time to any other people. It is interesting to
note that SueIOnius in his recitation of the same incident (although placing it a few years later) does not use
the Latin word "pirata" or any ofits derivatives at all: "While crossing to Rhodes •.. he [Caesar] was taken
by pirates [praedonibus] near the island of Pharmacusa ..• [Hue . .• circa Pharmacussam insulam a praedonibus
captlls est. .•. ]."1 Suetonius, The Lives of the Caesars G.C. Rolfe, trans!.) (LCL rev'd ed. 1928) i, 4 at p. 7.
Suetonius was writing about 120 A.D. IJ., Introduction by Rolfe at p. xii.
54. Cicero, Selected Works (M. Grant, trans!') (Penguin Classics 1971) at p. 177 note 1. Among Cicero's
last works were 14 "Philippics" Against Antony. The revival of the "pirate" communities of the Eastern
Mediterranean was noted by Cicero in a letter to his friend Atticus. See note 38 above.
55. A convenient summary of dates, names and structure of the Justinian Digest and its place in the legal
literature is Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (corrected ed. 1969). The dates and other general
information retailed here appear passim, esp. p. 30, 39-42.
56. CorpusJuris Civilis (Mommsen & Krueger text, Kunkel ed.) (1954), XLIX.15.19.2, Paulus, On Sabinus,
Bk. xvi: "A piratis aut latronibus capti liberi permanent." My translation is identical to that in 9 J.B. Scott, The
Civil Law (1932) at p. 184, except for the interpolation of the word "legally" to avoid the absurd reading
that captives are in fact free.
57. CorpusJuris Civilis XLIX.15.24: Ulpianus, Institlltes: "Hostes sunt, quibus bellum publice populus Romanus

decrevit vel ipsi populo Romano: ceteri latrunculi vel praedones appellantur et ideo qui a latronibus captus est, servus latronum
non est, nee postliminium i/li necessarium est: ab hostibus autem captus, ut puta a Germanis et Parthis, et servus est Irostium
et postliminio statum pristinum recuperat."
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58. Id. L.16.118: Pomponius, Book II, Ad Quintum Mucium: " 'Hostes' hi sunt, qui nobis aut quibus nos
publice bellum decrevimus: ceteri latrones aut praedones sunt. "
59. It apparently dates back to Greek conceptions. See text and works cited at note 17 above.
60. See below at note 120.
61. The phrase appears to have gained currency as a shortening of the passage from Cicero quoted in
note 49 above. The source of the paraphrase "hostes humani generis" has not been found. Blackstone
attributed it to Sir Edward Coke. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (American Edition
1790), p. 71. The phrase appears in Coke, Third Institute ofthe Laws ofEngland (1628) (first published 1644) p.
113: "pirata est hostis humanigeneris." But the form, as a Latin insertion in an English text, makes it look like a
stock phrase Coke was borrowing from another source. See note 201 below. Coke finished his Third Institute
in 1628 and died in 1634. The Third and Fourth Institutes were published at Parliamentary order from Coke's
notes ten years later, when it was felt that Coke's well-known views of the supremacy of the law to the
prerogatives of the Crown would help in the Parliamentary struggle against Charles I. Bowen, The Lion and
the Throne (1956), p. 510. Another possible source for Coke's phrase is Sallust, op. cit. note 35 above, 81.1, in
whichJugurtha refers to the Romans themselves as "men with no sense ofjustice and of insatiable greed,
common enemies of all mankind [Romanos iniustos, profunda avaritia communis omnium hostis esse ••. ]" (Hanford
transI., Penguin ed. p. 113; LCL ed. p. 302).
62. This is not the place to analyze the Roman law of postliminium. Its modem descendant is visible in
the classical law of prize and salvage, and will be addressed as necessary in Chapter II below.
63. See note 35 and text at notes 2 and 3 above.
64. The earliest usages recorded by the Oxford English Dictionary are:
••• 1387 Trevisa, Higden (Rolls) VI, 415 the "see theves" of Danes (L. Dani piratae); 1426 Lydg. De
GuiI. Pilgr. 23963, I mene pyratys of the Se, which brynge folk in pouerte. 1430-40 - Bochas Lxii
(1544) 38 this word pirate ofPirrhus toke the name. 1522 J. Clerk in Ellis Orig. Letti. Ser III.1.312,
Pirats, Mores and other Infidels ...
OED "O-P" p. 901. Higden (or Higdon) and the Polychronicon are explained in 13 Encyclopedia Britannica
(11th ed.) 454 (1910);John de Trevisa's translation and its place in the development of the English language
is put into perspective in 9 id. 592. Trevisa's translation was apparently issued in 1387; there seems to be
some petty inconsistency in the secondary sources about the date. As noted in the text above this note, it is
not significant for present purposes, since the word "pirate" does not in fact appear in the English
translation by Trevisa and the equation of the Latin "piratae" with the Middle English "see theves" appears
to have no legal, or even any clear vernacular, meaning worth preserving except as an illustration of
picturesque speech and some surviving underlying sense of the impropriety by the law of England as
perceived in the 14th century of the activities of Vikings about three centuries earlier.
65. Braudel, La Mediterranee et Ie monde mediterraneen a l'epoque de Philippe II (1949). Because of the
importance of the specific words I have translated the French original myself despite the existence of a fine
English translation by Sian Reynolds of the 1966 2nd (revised) edition of Braudel's masterpiece. Braudel,
The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age ofPhilip II (S. Reynolds, transI.) (1973). In the original,
p. 694, the text is as follows:

Sur I'Ocean, au XVIe siei:le aussi bouleverse que la mer Inttrieure par les pirates, et des pirates peut-etre plus cruels,
la course prend un masque, se deguise en guerre semi.officielle avec la multiplicite des lettres de marque. ••• On adit
et r"epete que la piraterie etait fille de la Mediterranee. Image juste, mais sou vent perdue de vue: les historiens n'ont
d'attention et de reprobation que pour les corsaires barbaresques. Leur fortune, qui fut grande, aerobe Ie reste du
paysage. Tout s'en trouve deforme. Ce que I'on aesigne, chez les Barbaresques, sous Ie nom de piraterie, s'appelle
heroisme, pur esprit de croisade chez les Chevaliers de Malte et us non moins feroces coureurs de mer que furent les
Chevaliers de Saint-Etienne, bases aPise par les soins de Cosimo de Medicis.
66. Id. For convenience, citations to Braudel below will be used to refer to his work as translated by
Reynolds, and the Reynolds translation will be quoted without closer analysis of its use of the word
"pirate" or its derivatives.
67. Id.,p. 749.
68. Id.,p. 728.
69. Id., p. 822: "As early as 1552 and again in 1565,Jewish protests had singled out for complaint the ships
of the 'most evil monks' of Malta, that 'trap and net which catches booty stolen at the expense ofJews', "
citingJ. HaCohen, Emek Habkha, la valreedes pleurs.•• 172 (1881) for the inner quotes. Braudel, op. cit. 822 note
371.
70. Id., p. 870.
71. Id., pp. 883-884.
72. Cf. Defoe, Robinson Crusoe (1719) ch. 1. Defoe is also supposed to be the author of A General History of
the Pirates (1718) under the pseudonym of Capt. Charles Johnson.
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73. Chamberlain, The Chamberlain Letters: A Selection . .. (E.M. Thomson, ed.) (Capricorn Books 1966) 12
(letter no. 16 to his friend Dudley Carleton in the standard collection edited by N.E. McClure).
74. Id. 124 (letter no. 132 to Carleton dated 29 January 1612).
75. ld. 226 (letter no. 434 to Carleton dated 12 July 1623).
76. Naval Songs and Ballads (NRS, Vol. 33) xx-xxi, 25-29 (1907). Rising national pride, so evident in
Shakespeare's historical plays of this period, particularly Richard II, II. iAO (1595) Oohn of Gaunt's paean to
England) and Henry V (1599), led CaptainJohn Smith in the last chapter of his Travels to attribute the war
capabilities of the Turks and Moors to English renegades, whom he calls "pirates." That view found its
way into English folklore, apparently through the writings of Andrew Barker, A True and Cer/aine Report of
the Beginnillg, Proceedings etc. ofCaptaine Ward and Danseker, the Late Famous Pirates (1609), cited in Sir Godfrey
Fisher, Barbary Legend(1957) 160. According to Fisher, Dansekerwas executed by the Dey of Tunis in 1611.
ld. p. 142. Ward died in the Tunis plague of 1622-23. Id. p. 161. The idea that the Turks, whose fleets
dominated the Mediterranean under Suleiman the Magnificent until their defeat at the battle of Lepanto in
1571, had to learn military tactics or seamanship from an Englishman, seems at least something of an
exaggeration. There was in fact a revolution in maritime ventures at this time, in which new sail
technology made ocean voyages feasible that had been too risky before, and the Mediterranean Muslim
powers rejected it in favor of old, maneuverable, short-range galleys. But that change seems irrelevent to
the activities of Ward and Danseker. Parry, The Age of Reconnaissance (1964) 69-84; Hess, The Forgottell
Frontier (1978) 208-209.
77. Chamberlain, op.cit. note 73 above 281 (letter no. 374 to Carleton dated 10 March 1621): "We hear
that Si;,Robert Mansell and his fleet have done just nothing, but negotiated with those of Algiers for certain
slaves.
78. Naval Songs and Ballads, pp. 31-32, "The lamentable cries of at least 1500 Christians: Most of them
being Englishmen ... "
79. Id., pp. xxii-xxiii.
80. See below.
81. Calendar ofState Papers, Colonial Series, East Indies, China andJapan, 1622-1624 (Sainsbury, ed.) No. 143 at
p. 64 (1878,1964). This is in a report dated 27 August 1622 from the British East India Company's Council in
Batavia (Richard Fursland (President), Thomas Brockedon and Augustine Spaldinge) to the Company in
London.
82. ld., No. 367 at p. 196. Fursland had died and was replaced on the Council by Henrie Hawley and John
Goninge; Thomas Brockedon apparently acted as President.
83. Id., No. 368 dated 14 December 1623 at p. 202, report to the Company in London.
84. Id., No. 565, p. 365, signed by Brockedon, Hawley and Goninge.
85. Id., No. 303, p. 125, Minutes ofmeetings concluding 23 June 1624. Eventually, the Company paid two
tenths to the King in order to obtain the release of their vessels from arrest by the Admiral.
86. ld., No. 481, p. 294, Minutes dated 23-25 June 1624.
87. In addition to Braudel,loe. cit. above note 65, see Fisher, op. cit., note 76 above, esp. pp. 137-145 and
sources cited there.
88. Belli, De Re Militari et Bello Tractatus (1563 ed. photographically reproduced) (CECIL 1936) Part II, ch.
xi: " ... excipi Piratae ••• qui enim omnes habent pro hostibus, debent ab omnibus expectare rependi vices • •• " The
translation by H.S. Nutting is published in another volume of the same set. The English excerpts in the text
above this note are from p. 83 of the translation volume by Nutting. On the post-glossa tors, see Nicholas,
op. cit. note 55 above at p. 47.
89. Belli, op. cit., (Nutting, transl.) p. 83. The Latin (p. 39) refers to persons who "sint extra omlle legum"
but does not use any single word for "outlaw."
90. Id., p. 88, Part II, ch. xiv. Belli quotes Cicero verbatim. See note 46 above. See also note 50 above and
note 124 below, where the position of Grotius and his criticism of this passage by Cicero are set out more
fully.
91. Ayala, De lure et Officiis Bellicis et Disciplina Militari O.P. Bate, transl.) (CECIL 1912) I, ii, 15. The
original says:

Hine iura belli, captiuitatis, & postliminy, quae hostibus tan tum eonueniunt, non posse rebdlibus con venire,
consequens videtur: sieut nee piratis & latronibus (qui hostium numero non continentur) conueniunt, quod ita in/elligi
debet, vt ipsi iure belli agere non possint: ideoqi dominium rern eaptarum non acquirunt, quod hostibus tan tum
tributum est in ipsos vero iure bellifaeuire, multoque magis quam in hostes, Iicet: suntenim odio digni maiorf, &non
debet esse melioris conditionis rebellis & Iatro, quam legitimus & iustus hostis.
Oddly, the Latin version is photocopied from the first edition of1581, but the translation seems to be based
on the 1597 edition.
92. Ayala's father was a Spaniard, married to a Belgian and resident in Antwerp for some 16 years before
the birth of Balthasar in 1548. The Ayala family were very well connected with the Habsburg monarchy.
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The Act of Abjuration was passed by the States General of the Netherlands in 1581. Until 1648, Spain
denied the legal labels resulting from the ability of the Netherlands to maintain its independence militarily.
The standard works on this watershed episode in European history are J.L. Motley, The Rise of the Dutch
Republic (1856) and The United Netherlands (1860).
93. Gentili, De lure Belli Libri Tres (1612) O.C. Rolfe, trans!', introd. by Coleman Phillipson) (CECIL
1933) 12a-14a.
94. IJ., Book I, ch. ii. The English translation throughout is by Rolfe. The Latin is from the
photographic reproduction of the edition of1612 in 1 Gentili, op. cit. Rolfe's translation of"iusta" as 'Just"
seems very dubious. See note 46 above.
95. IJ., p. 22, quoting the passages from Ulpian and Pomponius set out in notes 57 and 58 above. In
Gentili's quotations as in the originals, the word "pirata" or its derivatives does not appear; those debarred
from entering the legal state of war are termed "latrunculi" or "praeJones." Thus the Rolfe translation of
Ulpian, "All others are termed brigands or pirates" (p. 15) seems a serious mistranslation of Gentili's
quotation from Ulpian: "caeteri latrunculi, vel praeJones appellantur." Also, Gentili's conclusion immediately
following the quotations from Pomponius and Ulpian, "That is to say, the war on both sides must be public
and official and there must be sovereigns on both sides to direct the war [Publica ergo esse anna vtrinq; oportet, &
utrinq; esse Principes, qui bellum gerant]," seems a non sequitur.
96. IJ., ch. iv.
97. IJ. Again, Rolfe's translation seems imprecise; Gentili did not say that Pomponius and Ulpian
actually came to that conclusion, but that that legal conclusion flowed from their definition.

98. IJ. "Piratae omnium mortaliu hostes sunt communes. Et itaque negat Cicero, posse cum istis interceJere iura belli. "
99. IJ. "Si praeJonibus pactum pro capite pretium non attuleris, nullafraus est ••• " Rolfe translation: "Ifyou do

not pay brigands the price demanded in exchange for your life, you do no wrong ... "
100. IJ., last lines of the chapter:

SeJ quiJ selltimus nos Je his Callis, qui capti postremo bello Lusitanico ab Hispanis, & tractati sunt non quasi iusti
hastes? Tractati sunt quasi piratae: qui Antonio militarent, pulso iam Je regno vniuerso, & in regem agnito ab
Hispanis nuqua. At ipsa historia vincit, eos non fuisse piratas: non Jico per argumentum Juctum a numero, &
qualita te virorum, ac nauium; seJ per literas,quas regis sui ostenJebant, cui regi seruiebant, non Antonio, esti
maxime pro Antonio. quoJ illos non tangebat.
101. See text at note 93 above. A collection of Gentili's briefs before the English Royal Chamber was
published posthumously in 1613. Gentili, Hispanicis AJvocationis (1613,1661), reproduced photographically
by CECIL in 1921. The English translation of the 1661 text published in Vo!' II of the same set is by F.F.
Abbott.
102. See, e.g., letter of1295 (23 Edw. I) authorizing an English captain to make capture [licentia marcanJ'l
up to the value of the goods spoiled by "the men and subjects of the realm ofPortuga!." 1 Marsden, ed.,
Documents Relating to Law anJ Custom of the Sea (NRS, Vo!' 49) (1915) 38.
103. The OxforJ English Dictionary definition is in Vo!' VI, p. 179. It defines "marque" as meaning merely
"reprisal" and traces it back to medieval Latin "marcare," "to seize as a pledge." The first English use
given is the law-French ofa statute, 27 Edw. III, stat. 2 c. 17 (1353) quoted in part in the text above this note.
See note 176 below. The American Heritage Dictionary, pp. 751, 1529, traces the word back to the IndoGermanic root "merg-": "Boundary, border" via Old Provent;al "marcar," "to seize." The phrase
"marquanJi sue gagianJi" ("marque and recapture"?) appears in a document of 1293 cancelling a similar
license that had apparently been issued earlier. 1 Marsden, op. cit., p. 19, 38-39.
104. The practice of holding prize courts only in the territory of the capturing country as an aspect of
belligerency does not seem to have become clearly established until somewhat later. 2 Marsden, op. cit.
(NRS, Vol. 50) (1916) xii.
105. Gentili, Hisp. AJv. cited note 101 above, Book I, ch. iv at p. 15.
106. IJ., ch. xv at p. 68: " ... stenJi piratis locum oportunissimum navigationibus propinquissimum Hispanicis,

habitat.m, mercatoribus Anglis, ubi praeJas suas possint suis Jistrahere, sijusistuJ constituiturfisci illus terrae. Hoceine pro
mercatura?" The translation by Abbott seems unnecessarily awkward.
107. IJ.; ch. xxii at pp. 101-105. This is not the place to argue substance, but it might be noted that
Gentili's argument seems to confuse liens based on salvage-like services with property rights derived from
a thief. The first derive from principles well known in Gentili's time. Aside from the analogy to
postliminium and the Roman law principles set out in part inJustinian's Digest and mentioned above, the
Laws of Oleron, cited at note 150 below, articles 3, 22 and 30, had already been part of the Law of England
for about 400 years and established the basis for the modern English law of maritime salvage.
108. See below, Chapter II.
109. He is not specific, but seems to be referring to ch. iv cited at note 105 above.
110. IJ., ch. xxiii, pp. 105-112atp. 112: " ... quoJeripiturnostrisnegotiatio Tunetana, Algeriana, alia non una per
I,aee Venetorum Jicta, quoJ sint illae civitates nil aliuJ nisi receptacula piratarum, neJ in illis sint nisi piratae, & sint in illis

ipsi quoque magistratus piratae. "
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111. Gentili's approach, which might be considered the birth of "positivism" as an operating theory of
international law, is most lucidly elaborated and the role of "recognition" harmonized with current
practice by Kelsen, Recognition in International Law, 35 AJIL 604 (1941), and Gross, States as Organs of
International Law and the Problem of Autointerpretation, in Lipsky, ed., Law and Politics in the World
Community (1953) 59-88 reprinted in 1 L. Gross, Essays on International Law and Organization (1984) 367.
112. Dumbauld, The Life and Legal Writings ofHugo Grotius (1969) 3-4; "Voila Ie miracle de Hollande, " id., at p.
56 note 165.
113. Id., p. 23, 58. Grotius died in 1645, reportedly regretting that "by undertaking many things, I have
accomplished nothing!" Id., p. 18.
114. Id., p. 16.
115. 2 Grotius, op. cit. note 46 above, Book III, chs. i and ii (p. 630-631).
116. Id., p. 631. The key passages in the original Latin are: "Non autem statim respublica aut civitas essedesini,
si quid admit tat injustum, etiam communiter, nee coetus piratarum aut latronum civitas est, etiamsi forte aequalitatem
quandam inter se servent, sine qual nullus coetus posset consistere. Nam hi criminis causa sociantur: iIIi etsi interdum delicto
non vacant, juris tamen fruendi causa sociati sunt, et exteris jus reddunt ••• " 3 Grotius, DeJure Belli ac Pacis (Whewell
ed.) III, ii, 1 (1853) p. 54-55. Unless the context indicates otherwise, all citations below to Grotius's Latin
original text are taken from Whewell's edition, and all English translations are by Kelsey.
117. See above note 57.
118. Caesar, De Bello Gallico, VI, xxiii; Tacitus, De Morib. Germ. ch. 46, Ann. xii, 27, Hist. iv, 50. These
citations by Grotius do not seem particularly strong to support his point, but the point itself, that the
Germanic tribes were treated as legal enemies in war despite the Roman opinion that their political and
social organization was contemptible, is beyond dispute.
119. Appian, Bell. Illyr. ii; 9 Plutarch, op. cit. above note 33.
120. It was pointed out in the text above at note 57 that Justinian's Digest addresses the legal inability of
"pirates" to effect a change in the personal status of captives, but extends that legal incapacity in the case of
property only to "Iatrones" and "praedones."
121. Grotius, op. cit. Book III, ch. iii, sec. ii para 3.
122. Grotius does not say how this comes about legally, implying that it is not by "recognition," but by
the force of natural law.
123. Grotius, op. cit. Book III, ch. iii, sec. 8 last sentence, quoting with approval St. Augustine, De Civ.
Dei IV, iv: "[H}oc malum si in tantum perditorum hominum accessibus crescit, ut et loca teneat, sedes constituat, civitates
occupet, populos subjuget, regni nomen assumit [If by accessions of desperate men this evil grows to such
proportions that it holds lands, establishes fixed settlements, seizes upon states and subjugates peoples, it
assumes the name of a kingdomJ." It is hard to see how this description could not be applied to the "pciraton"
of67 B.C.
124. Grotius used the word "pirata" or its derivatives in five other places in DeJure Belli ae Pacis: (1) In
confuting Cicero as mentioned at note 46 above (Book II, ch. xiii para. 15(1»; (2) In a passing reference to
Roman taxes for Red Sea navigation beingjustified by the expenses ofsuppressing "piracy" (Book II, ch. iii
para. 14); (3) In a passage slightly amending Cicero's position that oaths to enemies must be kept while
oaths to "piratae" need not be kept-Grotius eviscerates Cicero's entire polemical point by adding "unless
an oath prevents," i.e., unless you have promised the pirate that you would keep your word to him! (Book
II, ch. xvii para. 19; cf. above note 50); (4) In a passage approving the exchange oflegation with rebels but
not with "pirates and brigands, who do not constitute a state [Pirataeet latrones, qui civitatem nonfaciunt]" and
therefore do not come under the rule of the law ofnations-but this rigid position is immediately softened
by observing that "Sometimes, nevertheless, persons of such character obtain the right oflegation on the
strength of a pledge of good faith [Sed interdum tales qui sunt,just legationis nanciscuntur fide data]" (Book II, ch.
xviii, para. 2(3»; and (5) In a possible slap at Gentili through mention of the record showing Pompey to
have concluded his war with the pirates "in great part by means of treaties [Atqui belli piratici magnam partem
Cn. Pompeius paetionibus confecit]" (Book III, ch. xix para. 19(2)(2». Curiously, the indexes to neither the
Kelsey translation nor the Whewell edition carries a reference to the first of these uses.
125. Id. III, ix, 19(2). This language appears in the Amsterdam (Blaeu) edition of1632. I have not been
able to check the 1631 and 1625 editions. It appears in all later editions.
126. In 1604 Grotius drafted an argumentative brief, completed in 1606, to justify the Dutch seizure in
the Straits of Singapore of a Portuguese "prize" at a time when the Dutch did not claim belligerent rights
against Portugal despite the union of the Portuguese and Spanish dynasties between 1580 and 1640. Basing
his argument on a "natural" right of trade and thus the inadmissability in law of Portuguese monopoly
treaties with the Sultans of the Malay Archipelago, Grotius concluded that the Portuguese actions were
criminal and that Dutch countermeasures could properly include captures in reprisal. 1 Grotius, De lure
Praedae Commentarius (1604) [sic] (Williams and Zeydel, transl.) (CECIL 1950) 327. The entire background is
conveniently set out and Grotius's principal arguments paraphrased and summarized in Dumbauld, op. cit.
23-56. The broader historical background is set out in Rubin, International Personality of the Malay Peninsula
(1974) 29-32.
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127. In the \Villiams and Zeydel translation the word "pirate" is used where, in note 126 and here, I have
used the word "criminal." It is not certain that either is correct. Volume II of the set contains a
photographic reproduction of the actual Latin manuscript, and in the page corresponding to p. 327 of the
translation in Volume I, (2 Grotius, De lure PraeJae Commentarius, p. 147) I cannot find the word "pirata" or
any of its derivatives. The word "Iatro" does appear but not in a place that seems to correspond to either of
the two places in which the translators have used the word "pirate." Although Grotius' handwriting seems
clear enough, I am not prepared to match my amateur acquaintance of Latin and my almost total
non-acquaintance with Dutch calligraphy of1604-1606 against the expertise of the translators. Still, for the
reasons set out above, it would be well to be cautious about this translation and its use of the word "pirate."
128. Grotius, DeJure Belli ac Pads Book II, ch. iii, para. 13(2).
129. E.g., Athenian claims asserted against Megara, Thucydides, op. cit., IV, cxviii, and Dio Cassius's
mention of "all the sea which belongs to the Roman Empire," Roman History, XLII, v.
130. The evolution of "England" to "Great Britain" and the "United Kingdom" (including Scotland,
which has its own legal history and current municipal law), involves a political narrative of daunting
complexity. Fortunately, it is not necessary for present purposes. It was the law of England, not the law of
Great Britain or the United Kingdom, that became the most influential set of prescriptions and was
administered by the most wide ranging system of naval activity and courts, and which lies at the roots of
American conceptions of the interplay between the municipal law of "piracy" and international law . The
law of Great Britain and of the United Kingdom will be referred to as appropriate later in the narrative.
131. It is not proposed in this place to trace the word or the concept (if there is any discrete concept) of
"piracy" in non-legal English usage. It might be useful to those so inclined to mention that the earliest trace
of the concept seems to be in the epic Beowulf(eighth century A.D.). In line 242 there is reference to the
sea-watch guarding the Danish coast that "Iathra naenig/mid scip-herge sceth than ne meahte [none of our enemies
with their fleet of ships might harm us]. " Chickering, Beowu/fi A Dual Language Edition (1977) 63. The word
"lathra" is translated "enemies" by Chickering. It is commonly translated "pirates." Cf. translation by
David \Vright in Penguin Classics edition (1957) at p. 32. Wright also translates as "pirates" (p. 33) the
word "feonda" in line 294. The similarity of the word "Iathra" to the Latin "Iatro" is too clear to be missed.
The Latin word "pirata" or its derivatives does not appear in Beowulf.
132. Regina v. Keyn (frequently indexed as R. v. Keyn, Reg. v. Keyn or The Queen v. Keyn)[1876] L.R.
2 Exch. Div. 63, reprinted at length in 2 British International Law Cases (BILC) 701 at 756-800. That case
turned on the question of whether the statutory municipal laws of England applied to acts by foreigners on
board foreign vessels in waters less than three miles from the English coast in the absence of a clear
indication from the Parliament that the law was intended to apply beyond the land, except in British flag
vessels. Fourteen judges heard the arguments. One died during the course of the proceedings and the final
decision, that the law of England did not apply to foreigners in foreign ships even in England's territorial
waters in the absence of a clear expression of Parliament's intention, was carried by a 7-6 majority with
substantive views expressed by nine of the judges in individual opinions.
133. Marsden, ed., Select Pleas in the Court of Admiralty (Selden Society, Vols. 6 and 11) (1894, 1897) and
Marsden, ed., Documents Relating to the Law and Custom ofthe Sea (NRS, Vo!s. 49 and 50) (1915,1916), cited at
notes 102, 104 above.
134. Cockburn relied heavily on Hale's Pleas of the Crown, but does not seem to have checked Hale's
sources. Hale, Pleas ofthe Crown (1685 ed.) 77, in fact refers to "Piracy" and "Depredation upon the Sea" as
a species of "petit Treason, if done by a [British] subject." Hale implies without any evidence what itwas
triable at Common Law until the Statute of Treasons, 25 Edw. III statute 5 c. 2 (1352). But his source is
clearly Coke, who in his Third Institute, emphasized not the "piracy" aspect of the offense, but its
relationship to the law of "treason," limiting the jurisdiction of British Common Law courts to the
jurisdiction they had in other cases of "petit Treason" and in no way implying any purview over the acts of
foreigners outside ofEngland. See note 201 below. Aside from this possible unintended implication in Hale,
there was no doubt that Hale knew that the offense of "piracy" was triable only at Civil Law, not Common
Law, in England from 1352 to 1536:
Since that Statute [of 1352] an offence triable by the Civil Law until 28 H. 8.15 [1536].
The Stat. 28 H. 8 alters not the offence; but it remains onely an offence by the Civil Law: and
therefore a pardon of all Felonies doth not discharge it: but it gives a trial by the course [i.e.,
procedures] of Common Law: ... It extends not to Offences in Creeks or Ports within the Body of a
County, because punishable by the Common Law.
"Civil Law" was the body oflaw administered by Admiralty and some other non-Common Law courts of
England. See below. Thus, to the degree Cockburn meant to imply that "piracy" in any way pertinent to
the case of foreign actions on board a foreign ship was historically an offense against English Common
Law, he was certainly wrong with regard to actions after 1352, and probably wrong with regard to actions
before then.
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135. 18 Edw. II (1325) and 25 Edw. III (1352).
136. 2 BILC 759.
137. 1 Marsden, Documents at p. 99-100 note 1.
138. Id. Table of Contents regardingp. 12, headnotes at p. 2, 6, 10,31,46,74,89,136,371,388,391. This
list is not exhaustive.
139. E.g., Holdsworth, A History of English Law (1922-1928).
140. Since in some cases Marsden modernizes the spellings, and in others he seems to prefer what seem
quaint and false antique spellings, it is impossible to be certain about the accuracy of his reprinted
"original" texts without duplicating his entire research; a patent impossibility at this time.
141. 1 Marsden, Documents 2.
142. Id., p. 7.
143. Id., p. 10-11.
144. Id., p. 8 and 69. Marsden interprets these documents of1276 and 1341 as involving the King in suits
before his own Common Law courts for a share of the value of a "prize" taken by English seamen without
license of the Crown. The King apparently lost.
145. IJ., p. 19, 38-39. See notes 102 and 103 above.
146. IJ., p. 19 (revoking a letter of "marque or reprisal [marquandiseugagiandll" in 1293); 38-39 (informing
the administrators of the realm of the proper issuance of letters of marque by "our nephew, John <>f
Brittany" in 1295); 88-89 (transferring the trial of English malefactors from the Common Law courts to the
jurisdiction of the Admiral's court because the robbery had occurred at an unspecified place at sea, not
within any particular shire of England in 1361-it is not clear whether this case involved any foreigners or
letters of marque).
147. Loc.cit. note 143 above.
148. IJ., p. 84-88.
149. IJ., p. 88-89, cited note 146 above.
150. 1 Peters, Admiralty Decisions . .. (1807) Appendix, p. iii.
151. 1 Marsden, Documents, pp. 100-101: "qui malefactores, et pacis nostre perturbatores diversas roberias
depredaciones sediciones ac inteifectiones"; English by Marsden.
152. IJ. p. 101-102: " ... legem et consuetudinem regni nostri Angliae et legem maritimam."
153. IJ., p. 132-134. The Latin original uses the word "pirata" (p. 135). I omit mention in the text of a
treaty of 1414 between Henry V and the Duke of Brittany which Marsden translates as containing an
obligation not to "receive any traitors, fugitives, banished men, pirates, or exiles." IJ., p. 127-128. As noted
above, W ~rsden's translations are not always reliable; Marsden does not quote any Latin or French text and
it is unliKely that the original was written in English; nor is Marsden's reported English version the English
of the time of Henry V.
154. Id., p. 145-146.
155. IJ.
156. IJ., p. 146-147.
157. IJ., p. xv, xviii.
158. Id., p. 149, where it is indicated that the Admiralty courts had been allowed to atrophy and were
revived only in 1520.
159. 27 Hen. VIII c. 4 (1535), in 4 Pickering, The Statutes at Large (1763) 348 sq.
160. IJ., 348-349. The 18th century English must be Pickering's transliteration. The original language is
not given in this source. Presumably it was identical with the language of the Preamble to 28 Hen. VIII c. 15
(1536). See below.
161. 4 Pickering, op. cit., 441-443; 26 AJIL Spec. Supp. 913-915 (1932). Reproduced in Appendix LA below.
162. See note 134 above; note 201 below. See the laws of Oleron, cited note 150 above, arts. V-VII,
XII-XIII, XIX. The blend between mere contract service and a status relationship entered into by contract
(as the feudal relationship was entered into by contract forms also) is too complex to analyze here. See
Pollock & Maitland, The History of English Law (2nd ed.) (1898) passim.
163. "Mutiny" enters the legal vocabulary in England only with the adoption of the Mutiny Act of1689,
1 \VilI. & Mary c. 5 (1689), referring not to mariners but to soldiers who "excite, cause, or join in any
mutiny or sedition in the army, or shall desert their majesties' service in the army."
164. Op. cit. note 161 above.
165. "A mere common crime, however wicked and base, mere wilful homicide, or theft, is not a felony;
there must be some breach of that faith and trust which ought to exist between lord and man," 1 Pollock &
Maitland, op. cit. note 162 above, 304. By Coke's time "felony" had come to cover all serious Common Law
offenses, but not Admiralty offenses and not treason, which had become a statuatory offense with its own
procedures. See Coke, Third Institute 15; note 201 below; Chapter II text above notes 4-33. See also 2 Pollock
& Maitland, op. cit. 502. As to the relationship between "trespass" and "felony," see id. 511-512.
166. The precise territorial boundary between Admiralty jurisdiction and the Common Law jurisdiction
evolved over time. The first boundary was merely between things done upon the sea and things done within
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the realm. 13 Rich. II c. 5 (1390). \Vithin two years Parliament had decided a clearer line was needed, and
drew it at the bridges nearest the mouth of the river, offenses upstream belonging to the Common Law
courts, because infra corpus comitatus, offenses downstream to the Admiralty. 15 Rich. II c. 3 (1392). An
excellent summary of the evolution of English and American statutory law and the struggle for jurisdiction
between the Common Law judges and Admiralty is in Robertson, Admiralty and Federalism (1970) 28-64. For
convenience, and because the details of that struggle are only peripherally interesting to this study, I have
referred generally to "navigable waters" as the extent ofAdmiralty jurisdiction with specific details given
only where pertinent to particular incidents or questions relating to the definition and treatment of
"piracy."
167. Cf. Sir Wi\liamScottin the Hercules [1819] 2 Dods. 363, 165 Eng. Rep. 1511 atp. 1517;26 AJILSpec.
Supp. 910 (1932).
168. On the origins and modem reflections of the Civil Law, see Nicholas, op. cit. note 55 above, p. 2;
Admiralty actions based on the adjudication of property rights, actions in rem, trace back to Roman law,
thus Civil Law, concepts. rd., p. 98-103. The experts in Civil Law in England were called "civilians," and
sharp distinctions with elements ofjealousy are evident in the attitudes of Common Law judges to the Civil
Law and the civilians at this period. See Lord Coke's references in Palachie's Case (1615) translated in the
text after note 194 below.
169. 2 Marsden, Select Pleas, p. 84-86.
170. Like Gentili (see text at note 93 above), Caesar was Italian by birth. He was the leading British
Admiralty judge, 1584-1605. 3 Dictionary of National Biography (DNB) 656.
171. 2 Marsden, Select Pleas, p. 161. Sir Julius simply recited as if proved that the vessel was "piratarum
super alto mari infra jurisdictionem marittimam Admirallitatis Anglie." He did not define "pirate," or "high seas,"
or his conception of the Admiral'sjurisdiction as it might have applied in the case.
172. 1 Marsden, Documents, p. 298. The holding that "he is [et esse]" (lit.: "and be") a "pirate" seems
unsupported by any reference to operative facts. It is not known why Marsden did not translate those two
words in his transcription quoted here.
173. Apparently the same person that had become notorious in English folk ballad at about this time. See
text at note 76 above.
174. 1 Marsden, Documents, pp. 373-373.
175. Molloy, DeJure Maritima (1677), Book I, ch. iv, para. xxi, p.12. "Prohibited" meant that a legal writ
of "prohibition" would issue from a Common Law court forbidding further Admiralty proceedings. The
procedure was popularized in the struggles between the Common Law judges led by Sir Edward Coke and
the prerogatives asserted by judges of other courts, of which there were many, in the early 17th century.
The fullest and probably still most readable and accurate summary of the scope of authority of the various
English courts of the time is Coke, Fourth Institute, cited at note 61 above. A "market overt" was merely a
market in which merchants displayed their wares and sold them to any buyer. Originally defined to include
only fairs and staples, by the end of the 18th century at the latest it included all the open shops in London all
days except Sundays. The law permitting a merchant in a market overt to pass good title to stolen goods,
including goods stolen by "pirates" (there seems to have been no distinction between goods stolen at sea or
on land at the time the basic rule was reduced to statute in 21 Henry VIII c. 11 (1529)), was regarded as
"calculated to answer the necessary ends and security of public commerce." 2 Wooddeson, A Systematical
View ofthe Laws ofEngland (1794) 431. The rule had an exception in the case ofgoods stolen either on landor
at sea if the thief were actually caught or convicted. rd. p. 412.
The statute of 1529 said:
••• That if any felon or felons hereafter do rob, or take away any money, goods, or chattels, from
any of the King's subjects, from their persons or otherwise, within this realm, and thereof the said
felon or felons be indicted ••• and found guilty therefor ... that then the party so robbed, or owner,
shall be restored to his said money, goods, and chattels.
4 Pickering, op. cit., 175. Since the statute applies only to takings from the King's subjects, and only to
takings within the realm, and neither Molloy nor \Vooddeson gives any basis for his interpretation other
than the statute itself for applying its terms to takings from foreigu merchants anywhere, or from English
subjects at sea, other than the rule in Justinian's Digest discussed in the text at notes 56-58 above, the precise
evolution of the rule seems doubtful. One possible explanation is given in 1 Hale, The History of the Pleas of
tile Crown (1778 ed. by Sollom Emlyn) 542: "Tho the statute speaks of the king's subjects, it extends to aliens
robbed; for tho they are not the king's natural-born subjects, they are the king's subjects, when in England,
by local allegiance." That still does not explain any application of the statute to goods "pirated" from any
merchants, English or foreign, at sea. \Vooddeson believed that it was a rule of English Common Law.
\Vooddeson.op. cit., p. 429. But the Common Law did not apply to offenses at sea. Wooddeson was the
third Vinerian Professor of English Law at Oxford (Sir \Villiam Blackstone had been the first), and his
lectures, published in 1792-94, were regarded by many as highly as the magisterial work of his more famous
predecessor, Blackstone, the author of the Commentaries. See Chapter II text at note 152 sq. below.
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176. Molloy, op. cit., para. xx. The statute is 27 Edw. III statute 2 c. 13 (1353). Assuming Molloy's
summary of the law reflected accurately the legal position in 1677, it is a bit confusing. The statute he cited
is part of the famous Statute of the Staple. 2 Pickering, op. cit., 78 (1762). In Pickering's translation it says:
13. Item, we will and grant, That if any merchant, privy or stranger, be robbed of his goods upon
the sea, and the goods so robbed come into any ports within our realm and lands, and he will sue for
to recover the said goods, he shall be received to prove the said goods to be his own by his marks, or
by his chart or cocket, or by such good and lawful merchants, privy or strangers. (2) And by such
proofs the same goods shall be delivered to the merchants, without making other suit at common
law.

Id., p. 87. The last sentence relates to the fact that the law of the staple was the Law Merchant, not the
Common Law. Id., p. 92, 27 Edw. III 2 c. 22 (1353). It is noteworthy thatthe statute does not give any special
favor to English merchants, but applies equally to merchants "strangers" (foreign) as to merchants "privy"
(English). Molloy gives no citation to cases or statutes to explain the construction giving rights of recovery
to English merchants that are withheld from foreigners. Of course, the word "piracy" does not appear in
the statute of1353. As noted in note 103 above, the word "marque" does appear in another chapter of the
Statute of the Staple, c. 17, dated in the Oxford English Dictionary to 1354 instead of1353 as in Pickering.
The full text of that chapter illustrates the special care taken in England to safeguard the property rights of
foreign merchants, and thus, impliedly, the erosion of that concern by the mid 17th century when Molloy
was writing:
Item, That no merchant-stranger be impeached for another's trepass, or for another's debt,
whereof he is not debtor, pledge, nor mainpernour: (2) provided always, That if our liege people,
merchants or other, be indamaged by any lords of strange lands or their subjects, we shall have the
law ofmarque, and oftaking them again, as hath been used in times past, without fraud or deceit. (3) And
in case that debate do rise (which God defend) betweixt us and any lords of strange lands, we will
not that the people and merchants of the said lands be suddenly subdued in our said realm and lands
because of such debate, but that they be warned and proclamation thereof be published, that they
shall void the said realm and lands with their goods freely, within forty days after the warning and
proclamation so made ...
2 Pickering, op. cit., 89. The statute and the problems discussed in the text illustrate also the impossibility of
maintaining private recapture under a theory of the Crown's internal responsibility without engaging the
Crown's external responsibility; there is apparent a transition from letters of marque and reprisal as a way
consistent with feudal law to avoid going to war on a "sovereign" level, to letters ofmarque and reprisal as
an exercise of belligerent rights valid only on the "sovereign" (or public) level. See Clark, The English
Practice with regard to Reprisals by Private Persons, 27 AJIL694 (1933). A summary of this evolution, with
citations useful to those interested in further study, can be found in Sohn & Buergcnthal, International
Protection of Human Rights (1973) 23-40.
177. 1 Marsden, Documents, p. 38B-394. The Privy Council extract is at note 1 on p. 394. Quaere if this is
the same Newporte mentioned in Chamberlain, op.cit. note 73 above 34 (letter no. 61 dated 2B February
1603) as having taken a treasure rumored to be worth 2 million pounds in Nombre de Dios and Cartagena.
17B. See text at note 86 above.
179. 1 Marsden, Documents 224, from a recital in an unsigned opinion Marsden identifies as probably a
copy of a 1579 legal memorandum from David Lewes,judge of Admiralty, to the Lord Admiral setting out
the bases for the Admiral's legal authority. This is the earliest document found setting forth a basis for what
later came to be asserted as "universal" jurisdiction in all countries to enforce their domestic laws against
foreign "pirates" for their acts solely directed against foreign victims. That the roots of that concept lay in
the municipal (English) law of "outlawry" and not in any international practice or Roman law, appears to
have been forgotten by later writers and statesmen. See Chapter III below.
, 180. 1 Marsden, Documents 173 note 1, paraphrasing "Instructions to Vice-Admirals of the coast" dated
1563.
IB1. Id., p. 216-217.
IB2. Id., p. 217.
183. Id., p. 21B, setting out a sample commission.
IB4. Id., p. 202-204.
IB5. Id., p. 21B note by Marsden paraphrasing Burghley's letter.
186. Id., p. 220-221.
187. Id., p. 224-225.
18B. Id., p. 227-229.
189. Id., p. 235-236.
190. Id., p. 252.
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191. After Elizabeth was succeeded by James I in 1601 there was a further tightening of the
administration, and commissions to companies engaged in normal mercantile voyages in the Mediterranean
or along the African coast began specifically to include authoriry to capture "pyrates." !d., p. 377-378
(Commission dated 1609 from James to the Lord Admiral, Charles Earl of Notingham, authorizing him to
allow ships of the Levant Company to take "anie pyraticall shipp ... , of what nation soever, ... to bee
tryed and proved by lawe and justice ... and soe suffer the payne ofour [sic] lawes for theire pyracie ... ");
p. 385-386 (Order of1612 from Notingham to his staff to issue a commission to Humphrey Slaney "to resist
and take such piratts and robbers att seas as shall piratically sett upon them ... " as they trade to "Guiney"
(Guinea». There is an implication that pirate-hunting in the absence of such a commission was
unauthorized by English law, and an Englishman doing it might find himself in serious trouble at home
whatever the strength of David Lewes's or Gentili's legal arguments about the nature of "piracy" at
international law. By the end of the 17th century it seems to have been standard practice in England to
require those who might encounter "pirates" to procure a license to capture them before setting out. See,
e.g., the \Varrant by Charles II (signed by Samuel Pepys) in 1684 authorizing ''John Castel ... to seize and
destroy all such pyrats, freebooters, and sea rovers, which he shall meet within the limits of[the Royal
Affrican] companye's charter ... " 2 Marsden, Documents 112-113. Apparently this authoriry did not extend
to "pirates" outside the limits of the charter. When, in 1697, the East India Company found "pirates" of
the Kidd and Every sort (see Chapter II note 91 sq. below) a serious threat to their trade, they petitioned the
Lords Commissioners executing the office of the Lord High Admiral of England for a license "to seize and
take all pyrates infesting those seas within the limits of the Company's charters." They asked at the same
time for authoriry to set up an Admiralry tribunal "to trye and condemn such pyrates as they shall take."
!d., 178-180.
192. !d., p. 300, Proclamation of 1599.
193. 1 Rolle 175 (1615), King's Bench, Easter Term. An English version sub nom. The King against March
taken from 3 Bulstr. 27 is reproduced in 3 BILC 767-769.
194. The captor was "Sam. Palachie." "Joseph Pallache" is mentioned in Fisher, op. cit., 175, as the
Moroccan commander of an Atlantic fleet three ofwhose prizes reached England in 1614. Chamberlain, op.
cit., 212-213 (letter no. 213 to Carleton dated 24 November 1614) refers to "a Jew pirate arrested that
brought three prizes of Spaniards into Plymouth. He was set out by the King of Morocco, and useth
Hollanders' ships and, for the most part, their mariners. But it is like he shall pass it over well enough, for he
pretendeth to have leave and license under the King's hand for his free egress and regress ... "
195. It is not clear whose words are thus reported by Rolle. Sir Edward Coke and Sir John Doddridge are
identified by Rolle as members of the panel. Coke gives some details lacking in Rolle's more or less official
report. Apparently the Spanish Ambassador had complained directly to the King's Council, which referred
the case to the Chief Justice (Coke), the Master of the Rolls (Doddridge) and Sir Daniel Dun (judge of
Admiralry). "And the said referees heard the Counsel learned both in the Common and Civil Laws, on both
sides on two several days in this Term: and after conference between themselves, and with others, these
points were resolved ... " Coke, Fourth Institute cap. XXVI at p. 152-154.
196. The major doubts reported by Rolle were resolved in favor ofPalachie on the basis of a precedent
pronounced by Lord Popham in King's Bench, 1605, in which a Dutchman landing captured Spanish goods
in England while England was at peace with both Holland and Spain, was supported. According to Coke's
summary: "It was resolved by the whole Court of the King's Bench upon conference and deliberation, that
the Spaniard had lost the properry of the goods for ever, and had no remedy for them in England." Coke
summarized the law:
[H]e that will sue to have restitution of goods robbed at Sea, ought by Law to prove two things.
First, that the Sovereign of the plaintiff was at the time of the taking in amiry with the King of
England. Secondly, that he that took the goods was at the time of the taking in amiry with the
Sovereign of him whose goods were taken: for if he which took them was in enmiry with the
Sovereign of him whose goods were taken, then it was no depredation or robbery, but a lawful
taking, as every enemy might take of another ...
Coke, Fourth Institute 154. It seems significant that Coke does not mention commissions or letters of marque
and reprisal to authorize the taking.
197. The translation from the quaint law French of the time is mine. The English version reported in The
King against Marsh and cited at note 193 above seems obscure in places and not to follow the original law
French. The original is as follows:
[Sam. Palachie, a subject of the] Roy de Moroccho, & pretend que il est Embassador de son Royal United
Provinces & sur Ie mere il prist un Spanish niefe (esteant guerre enter Ie Roy de Barbary & Ie Roy de Spain) & puis
arrive ove ceo [avec r;al] en Engleterre, & Jarrenment Ie Spanish Embassador prosecute anvers luy come un Pirat, &

divers Civilians fuemnt commaund per Ie Roy a montre lour opinions de cest matter, lesqueur agree que un
Embassador est priviledge per la ley de nature & Nations, mes sil commit alcun offence encontre la ley de nature ou
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reason, il perdera son priviledge, mes nemy sil offend encountre un possitive ley d'alcun Relme com? pur apparrel & c.
Et divers auters questions fuerunt faits per les Civilians; mes quant jeo & alcunJustices al comen 1_1'fuernnt demand
pur notre opinions, ils disoint que les Civilians fuerunt beside Ie malter, car cestuy que est destre tridcy purpiracie est
destre trie sur l'estatute de 28 H.8 cap. [blank space in text] que dit que serra trie pur piracie come pur felonie fait
sur Ie terre al comen ley, & pur ceo nest piracie nisi ad estre felonie si mesme Ie fact ad estre commit sur Ie terre, mes en
cest case ceo n'ad estrefelonie si ad estre commit sur Ie terre [sic] car est loyall pur un enemie a prender de
I'auter, & accordant a notre opinions fuit rule accordant, & 2 R[ichard] 3.2. est que si alcun voilt
proseclltre vers auter SlIr 27 E[dward] 3 cap. 13. il que est robbe doit proover que il mesme fuit de amicitia Domini
Regis, & que cestuy que luy spoliavit fuit sub obedientia Domini Regis vel de amicitia, car si fuit inimicus non fuit
spoliatio sed legalis captio. Des en Palachies Case fllit agree per les Civilians que l'Embassador poet proceeder vers
luy civil/ie per les biens icy pur ceo que ils sont en solo amici, (R. Quaere ceo car semble que per la ley de nations un
enemie poet loyalment prenderde l'auter) Dod. est un reprise/l en Ie Register, Coke ceo estfo. 87. si biens ne sont
restore que sont i/loyalment prise per subject d'auter Roy donque Ie Roy grantera ceo. Et per Coke & Dod. home ne
poet estre pendus pur piracie sur un robberie fait sur Ie Thames car ceo est infra corpus comitallls.
The statute of27 Edward III cap.13 cited in the case is undoubtedly the part of the Statute of the Staple
quoted at note 176 above, 27 Edw. III 2 cap.13. There does not appear to be any language in the statute to
support Coke's assertion that a merchant claiming rights under it must prove that he comes from a "friend"
of the King and that he who robbed him was within the" obedience" of the king or one of his royal friends.
The statute 21 Henry VIII c. 11 (1529) quoted in note 175 above was interpreted this way, as the lawyers
apparently sought to make absolute sense of Common Law interpretations that had grown up without a
clear statutory base.
The citation to 2 R. 3.2 is very confusing. Pickering's compilation, the more or less standard Statl//es at
Large, does not give any enactments at all for the second year of the reign of Richard III (1484). None from
the prior year seems even remotely relevant. The statute 1 Henry VII c. 2 (1485) relates to foreign merchant
"denizens" in England, removing from them an exemption from customs duties that had been granted in
various earlier letters patent and other documents, alleging abuses by which non-denizen foreign
merchants were underselling English merchants by evading the customs duties. It looks like simple
protective legislation favoring an important English constituency, irrelevant to the subject. 4 Pickering, op.
cit., 526. It was ch. 13 of the Statute of the Staple that gave foreign merchants the legal right to use English
courts, and Coke's interpretation seems merely to reflect a Common Law gloss on its meaning.
Another, quite different statute, seems relevant although not cited by Coke: 14 Edward III st. 2 cap. 2 (1340):
Also whereas it is contained in the Great Charter [c. 30] that all Merchants shall have safe and sure
Conduct to go out of our Realm of England, and there to come and abide ..• ; \Ve ..• will and grant
... That all Merchants, Denizens and Foreigners (except those which be of our Enmity), may
without Let safely come ... , paying the Customs, Subsidies, and other Profits reasonably thereof
due ... [Et come y soit contenuz en la Grande Charte qe tOlltZ marchantz eient sauve et seure conduyt daler hors de

nostre roialme d'Engleterre ••. ; Nous . •• volons et grantons .•. qe touz marchantz denezeins et foreins, forspris
ceux qe sont de nostre enemite, puissent sanz estre destourbe sauvement venir en ledit roialme ..• ]
1 Pickering, op. cit., 508. But this statute relates to coming and going, not to access to the courts. It is, of
course, possible to speculate that if an "enemy" merchant had no legal basis for coming to England in this
statute, he could not legally appear in any guise before an English court; that his only right at English law as
an enemy alien would be to depart safely within a time fixed by English law. But that would be to attribute
to Coke a logic that he does not himself state.
198. 1 Rolle 285 (1615), King's Bench, Hilary Term.
199. Hildebrand, Brimston, & Baker fueront sue en Admiraltie Court, Ie case fuet tiel, ceux homes fueront owners d'un
neife, & ceo mist al Indies a merchandiser, & sur Ie alt mere les Mariners, & rendue commit Piracie (come est suppose en
L'admiraltie Court) & quant Ie neife retllm icy sur Ie Thames L'admiral seise Ie neife, & tout en ceo come bona Piratarium
clamant eux per Ie grant del'Royne, & les Marchants prisont les sailes & tackling hors del' neife, & pur ceo est Ie suite en Ie

Admiraltie Court. Covent. praie un Prohibition al Cour surcest malter. Coke est voier que Ie Admiraltie ad per legrand [sic;
grant?] del'Royn bona Piratarium, hoc est les proper biens de Pirats, mes il navera per ceo les biens que les Pirats emblee
d'auter homes, car ceux ne sont destregrant, car l'owners doint eux aver arare [?], & si L 'admiraltie duissoit aver eux ancoril
ne doit suer la pur eux esteant prise intra corpus Comitatus, scilicer, sur Thames. Dod. si home borrow un chiva/l, & SIlT ceo
commit un robberie uncose Ie chiva/l n'est forfet, ac icy Ie neift n'est forfeit [sic] pur Ie piracie de ceux que fueront deins Ie
neife, ql/od fuit concessumper Coke, & il demand de Covent. an ils fueront convict del'Piracie, que dit que nemy. Et
Prohibition fuit grant pur ceo que Ie prisa/l suit infra corpus Comitatus.
200. Coke, Third Institute, Cap. XLIX, p. 111.
201. Id., p. 113:
Before the statute of25 E. 3, if a subject had committed Piracy upon another ... this was holden to
be petit Treason, for which he was to be drawn and hanged: because Pirata est hostis humani generis,
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and it was contra ligeanciae suaedebitum: but if an Alien, as one of the Normans, who had revolted in the
reign of King John, had committed Piracy [sic. Coke obviously means "what would otherwise be
piracy"] upon a subject, this offence could be no Treason, for though he were hostis humanigeneris,
yet the crime was not contra ligeanciae suae debitum, because the offender was no subject, but since the
statute of 25 E. 3, this is no Treason in case of a subject.
The Statute of25 Edw. III referred to by Coke is the Statute of Purveyors (tax collectors), statuteS of that
year (1352) (2 Pickering, op. cit., 49), chapter 2 of which has come down to us as the "Statute of Treasons "
cited at note 134 above. By this statute, earlier uses of the word "treason" in law were superseded, and a list
of exclusive definitions was given:
\Vhen a man doth compass or imagine the death of our lord the King or of our Lady the Queen, or
their eldest son and heir ... or if a man do levy war against our Lord the King in his realm, or be
adherent to the King's enemies in his realm giving them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere

••• [.•• quant homme fait compasser ou imaginer la mort nostre seignurle Roi ma dame sa compaigne ou de lour
fitz primer & heir • •. & si homme leve de guerre contre nostre dit seignur Ie Roi en son roialme ou soit adherent as
[sic; adherant aux?] enemys nostre seignur Ie Roi en Ie roialme donant a eux eid ou confort en son roialme ou par
ail/ours • .• ]
The statute goes on to call "treason" the violation of feudal or common law obligations owed to lesser
mortals also:
And moreover there is another manner of treason, that is to say, when a servant slayeth his master,
or a wife her husband, or when a man secular or religious slayeth his prelate, to whom he oweth
faith and obedience ..• [Et ovesque ceo il y ad autre manere de treson cest assavoir quant un sewanttue don
[son?] meistre une femme qe tue son baron quant homme seculer ou de religion tue son prelat a qi il
doit foi & obedience ... ]
The former was eventually called "high treason;" the latter "petty treason. "2 Pickering, op. cit., 51-55.
202. See below at Chapter II note II-45 sq.
203. Southern v. Howe, 2 Rolle 5 (1617): "Auri icy nest alcun loyal dampnification al Plaintiff. carilfuit imprison

Illes /lull loyal proceedingfuit ewe vers luy, mes solment ilfuit compell perforce d'un barbarous Roy, &donque il doet suerper
Petition • .• "There were other grounds for the decision, such as the rule caveat emptor (let the buyer beware),
under which Howe and his servant did no legal wrong to the King of Barbary, and thus could not be
compelled to bow before the foreign law under which the fraud (at least when worked against the king)
would nullify the deal. But this is not the place to trace the development ofEnglish rules of conflict oflaws
or the law of fraud.
204. Again, as so often in this study, an interesting side-track must be resisted. For a full understanding of
the background against which the classification of the "King of Barbary" as a king and nothing else (he was
not argued to be a "pirate" as far as appears from Rolle's report of Southerne v. Howe) a full course in
English commercial, criminal and constitutional law of the early 17th century would be necessary.

